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Abstract 
This thesis conducts an analysis of the effects of reducing the mineral oil tax reimbursement 
scheme for the Norwegian short-sea shipping and fisheries sectors. An important 
contribution of this study is to review this measure in a wide context based on the 
Norwegian governments’ principles and goals relating to climate, environment and its goals 
for the short-sea shipping and fisheries sectors. Based on the dynamics of supply- and 
demand elasticities for the sectors, the likely tax-incidence determined. The tax incidence is 
in turn used to discuss and contrast the different outcomes of the tax increase for the sectors.  
Costs are expected to rise by at least 2.2 % for the short-sea shipping sector and 0.9 % for 
the fisheries sector. This increase will fall on the vessel- and ship-owners based on the tax 
incidence. In terms of the principles and goals for environmental taxes the effort is found to 
be a step in the right direction, but falling short of estimates of the social cost of carbon.  
The tax is found to be better for the fishing industry than the short-sea sector. Short-sea has 
environmental benefits over its closest competitors and the tax increase may shift volume to 
other modes of transport. Thus the measure may result in increased emissions from transport. 
Both effects undermine the goals for the short-sea sector. For fisheries sector some goals 
may be achieved with regards to profitability, reduced overcapacity/redundancy and 
investment in new technology. This may reduce emissions in the long run, but not in the 
short run because of perfectly inelastic supply due to fishing quotas.  
Going forward the reimbursement scheme should be held constant for the short-sea shipping 
sector at least until other sector goals are achieved. For the fisheries sector however, the 
reduction of the reimbursement should continue.  
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1. Introduction 
1.1 Motivation 
The effects of climate change, both potential and occurring, are at the forefront of public 
discussion in Norway. As traditionally a shipping and fisheries nation, the contributions of 
these sectors are important parts of the Norwegian climate policy discussion. The sectors 
have until recently been exempt from paying any mineral oil tax. This is rapidly changing; 
the prior government initiated an implementation of new taxes and the current government 
also seems determined increase the tax. The measure is in some circles believed to have the 
potential to reduce Norway's greenhouse gas emissions.  
The sectors are important parts of Norwegian domestic policy and the effort to maintain 
settlements in remote coastal areas. Regulating these industries have interesting connotations 
from both an economical and political view. In the public discussion issues regarding 
fisheries are largely discussed in domestic terms. This is puzzling bearing in mind that the 
industry is one of our largest export industries. Norwegian registered vessels also compete 
with vessels from other nations who may be subject to different regulations. This may have 
implications for the effect of a Norwegian tax increase if this is not followed by other 
nations. For short-sea shipping the discussion is somewhat reversed. There we mainly 
discuss our role in international shipping, while ignoring the potential of the short-sea 
segment to improve transport and emissions domestically.  
In recent times there have been calls for more research on shipping topics and the 
government has developed strategies for the short-sea sector (Ministry of Transport, 2013). 
This thesis aims to complement and contribute to this effort.  
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1.2 Purpose of thesis and statement of problem 
The purpose of this thesis is to outline the effects of reducing, and ultimately ending the 
mineral oil tax reimbursement scheme for the Norwegian fishing fleet and domestic short-
sea shipping. This effort will be evaluated in terms of the rationale behind the scheme, the 
costs and the implications for the sectors and in light of the governments stated goals for the 
sectors. The issue raises questions from an economic perspective as well as a political and 
environmental nature. Because the sectors have the potential to shift the cost of emissions to 
the customers it is not necessarily the case that the effective tax/fee will reduce national 
emissions.  
To address these issues, enforcement schemes, the size of fees and market dynamics as they 
relate to costs for the sectors and competitive environment will have to be addressed, and 
reviewed in light of the Norwegian governments stated principles and goals relating to 
climate, environment and its goals for the short-sea shipping and fisheries sectors.  
To do this the following questions will be explored: 
1. How will the reduction of the mineral oil tax reimbursement scheme affect the 
Norwegian short-sea shipping and fisheries sectors? 
2. Will the reduction help the government in reaching its "climate goals" and sector 
specific goals?  
3. Are there potentials for "double dividends" in terms of tax revenue, goal 
achievement and reduced emissions? 
4. Could anything be done differently? 
5. Based on the findings; what are the recommended course of action/polices going 
forward? 
In light of these questions and the climate/environment being a common good a natural 
limitation in this thesis is to view the issue at hand from the regulators side.  
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1.3 Structure of thesis 
Chapter 1 gives an insight in my motivation for writing this thesis, its purpose and a 
statement of the problem that is to be addressed. Chapter 2 provides context by outlining the 
Norwegian governments emission reduction goals that are some of the motivation behind the 
removal of the tax exemptions which are the topic of this thesis and giving short 
introductions to the short-sea shipping and fisheries sectors. Chapter 3 provides a thorough 
review of relevant theory concerning climate change, the concept of negative externalities 
and remedies to this problem in the shape of taxes, quotas and fees. This theory section 
informs the analysis discussion and recommendations in the following chapters. Chapter 4 
constitutes the  formal analysis and outlines the current reimbursement scheme, the 
governments goals for the sectors and climate. The section also determines the cost of the 
measure to the sectors and shows who is likely to end up  bearing the cost of the tax increase. 
Chapter 5 discusses the findings in the analysis comprehensively in light of the questions 
given in the purpose of the thesis and statement of problem; the effect on the sectors and 
goal fulfillment. Chapter 6 Briefly discusses some alternatives that to the current scheme 
that should be considered. Chapter 7 provides recommendations based on the findings of 
this study, while Chapter 8 concludes and sums it all up. Chapter 9 is a list of references 
used.    
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2. Background 
The Norwegian fisheries sector, the domestic short sea shipping and the domestic air traffic 
are some of the major contributors to the country's release of CO2 and other GHGs. 
According to Statistics Norway (SSB) (2014) the fisheries sector, the domestic short sea 
shipping contributed a combined 3,5 and the domestic air traffic contributed 1,3 million tons 
of CO2 out of a total of 44,1 million tons in total for Norway in 2013. Or roughly 8 percent 
for shipping and fisheries combined and roughly 3 percent for domestic air traffic. The total 
release of greenhouse gasses for Norway was 52,7 million tons of CO2-equvalents.  
It is a stated goal from policy makers that this amount should be reduced, and the parliament 
voted in favor of the so-called "Klimaforliket" in 2008 determining reduction goals (NOU 
2009:16, 2009; SSB, 2014). This national goal is that domestic emissions should not exceed 
45-47 million tons of CO2-equivalents in 2020. In 2013 the emissions exceeded the target by 
6-8 million tons. In other words, there is a long way to go. 
Norway has been awarded with quotas from the UN amounting to 50,1 million tons of CO2-
equivalents per year (Ministry of Climate and Environment, 2012). Thus current emissions 
exceed the awarded quotas. Norway can however still meet its obligations by the three 
mechanisms Joint Implementation, the clean development mechanism and buying quotas. 
According to the Kyoto-protocol Norway may also deduct some 1,5 million tons due to the 
uptake in Norwegian forests. But in the aforementioned "Klimaforliket", the government 
decided that country will not use this opportunity to fulfill its commitments.  
These reduction goals are some of the motivation behind the removal of the tax exemptions 
which are the topic of this thesis. The specifics of the taxes will be given in the analysis 
section after the theory and principles that inform their determination have been introduced.  
But first, and before the theory section, a short introduction to the short-sea shipping and 
fisheries sectors will be provided. 
2.1 The short-sea sector 
The term "short-sea shipping" means transport services conducted between either domestic 
harbours or harbours in neighbouring courtiers. This description is distinct from deep-sea 
shipping, which means intercontinental shipping (Stopford, 2009). 
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Short-sea shipping accounts for 37 percent of all intra-European transport measured in 
tons/kilometres (Amerini, 2008). According to the Norwegian "Sjøtransportalliansen", an 
interagency group representing harbour-operators, the Norwegian Shipowners' Association 
and Maritimt Forum, short-sea shipping accounts for over 42 percent of all domestic 
transport in 2012 (Sjøtransportalliansen, 2012).  
Short-sea shipping can further be divided into several distinct groups depending on type of 
cargo and ships that are used. There are several ways to do this distinction but an often cited 
one is Paixão and Marlow (2002) who uses four categories:  
1. Traditional single-deck carriers which can carry neo-bulk cargo such as timber, steel 
and other large objects.    
2. Container feeder vessels, which are smaller purpose-built container vessels that 
carry high-value cargo and provides a link from the deep-sea container vessels to 
smaller ports. 
3. Tankers and bulk carriers whose dimensions are less than 3000 deadweight tons 
(dwt) engaged in pure and conventional dry and liquid bulk trades such as mineral 
oil products, chemicals, LPG, coal, iron ore and grains.  
4. The last category is the fleet of different ferries engaged in short-sea shipping to 
varying degrees. There is however a debate to whether this category should be 
viewed as an extension of road transport rather than a short-sea shipping category.   
This thesis will not make distinctions between these categories in the general discussion. 
According to reports by Ministry of Fisheries and Coastal Affairs (2013c) and 
Sjøtransportalliansen (2012) the Norwegian short-sea fleet consists of about 1000 ships that 
sail both in Norwegian and European waters. There are about 550 registered companies in 
different segments of the short-sea sector with a combined income of NOK 9 billion each 
year. The different short-sea shipping companies employ roughly 10,000 seafarers 
(Sjøtransportalliansen, 2012). 
The short-sea segments of shipping are mired by low margins and operate in a highly 
competitive market. Norwegian companies compete both with other European actors and 
with road and rail transport (Hovi & Grønland, 2011). Short-sea shipping has consistently 
lost market-share over the last 50 years, having had a share of over 70 percent in 1960 and a 
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share of 42 percent today (Ministry of Fisheries and Coastal Affairs, 2013c; 
Sjøtransportalliansen, 2012). This in a period which has seen a large growth in transport 
work conducted. Especially in the container goods segment market share has been lost. In 
that segment for low volumes and where time is an issue road transport has a competitive 
edge. Bulk and tank are more persistent (Douet & Cappuccilli, 2011; Paixão & Marlow, 
2002; Paixão Casaca & Marlow, 2005).  
Compared to other modes of transport the advantage of short-sea shipping is that it can 
transport large volumes over long distances at a low price with comparatively low emissions. 
In addition there are few capacity limits and investing in infrastructure is relatively cheap 
compared to rail and road (Evensen, 2000; Ministry of Fisheries and Coastal Affairs, 2013c; 
Sjøtransportalliansen, 2012).  
Most prognosis show that the demand for transport is likely to increase substantially in the 
years to come(European Commission, 2011; Ministry of Transport, 2013) both domestically 
and within Europe. If current trends persist it is likely that the majority of this increase will 
come in the form of road transport. This is not desirable according to both the Norwegian 
Government and the European Commission (European Commission, 2011; Ministry of 
Transport, 2013), and several policies have been implemented to try and shift this trend. The 
success of these policies are limited however (Douet & Cappuccilli, 2011; Paixão & 
Marlow, 2002; Paixão Casaca & Marlow, 2005; Riksrevisjonen, 2014). If the potential for a 
modal shift in favor of short-sea is to occur, a lot has to be done. 
An integral part of this problem pointed out by several of these researchers and the industry 
itself, is that the short-sea industry is almost entirely self-financed both when it comes to 
infrastructure and equipment, whereas infrastructure projects in road and rail transport is 
largely publicly funded. Another issue is that short-sea shipping is heavily regulated 
compared to its competition.  
The message in these reports and studies is that if short-sea is to capture a larger market 
share in the years to come, the government needs to "put its money where its mouth is" and 
invest in better infrastructure for shipping and regulate road transport more heavily than it is 
today. Strategies to this effect is outlined in the government documents "Stø Kurs" (Ministry 
of trade and industry, 2013) and "Nasjonal Transportplan 2014-2023" (National transport 
plan) (Ministry of Transport, 2013) which will be discussed later.   
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2.2 The fisheries sector 
Capture fisheries have been an important part of the Norwegian economy ever since records 
began, and continues to be an important export article (Merete Gisvold Sandberg, Kristian 
Henriksen, Stian Aspaas, Heidi Bull-Berg, & Ulf Johansen, 2014). Capture fisheries 
comprises many different species and vessels. Fish species and fishing methods can be 
categorized depending on where they are located in the water column, feeding and migration 
habits. According to Grafton (2004) the three main categories are: 
1. Pelagic species, which include sardines and herring. These species travel large 
distances and are normally captured near the surface in schools. The equipment 
used is longlines or purse seines. 
2. Anadromous species are often grouped together with pelagics, but have different 
characteristics in that they spawn in streams and rivers. These species include 
Salmon. Equipment used is the same as pelagic in addition to traps and gillnets that 
entangle the fish. 
3. The last category is Demersal species such as cod, plaice, haddock and whiting. 
These species are often caught mid-water or close to the bottom, with trawls being 
the most commonly used equipment.     
According to the Norwegian fisheries directorates' "Registry of fisheries vessels" there were  
6,133 registered fishing vessels in Norway by 02/27-2014 (Directorate of Fisheries, 2014). 
255 of these are vessels larger than 28 meters, which is the common separation between the 
ocean going vessels and the coastal vessels. There are huge variations within this figure, with 
vessels spanning from small open vessels fishing close to their home port to large trawlers 
covering vast areas of the ocean. All sizes have seen a decrease since the 60's except the 
vessels in the 10-11 meter range which have seen a small increase in the recent years, now 
totalling 1,503 vessels. Figure 1 below shows the development of the fishing fleet over the 
years. As we can see there has been a steady decline since the 60's. 
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Figure 1: Number of fishing vessels registered in Norway (1925-2013) 
There are many reasons for the decline in the fleet. A major reason is that capture fisheries 
globally and locally has been mired by all the possible problems of common resources as 
proposed by the classic "tragedy of the commons"-problem, which according to Grafton 
(2004) denotes "the overexploitation or overuse (in an economic sense) of common-pool 
resources due to the absence of property rights" (p. 488). The resource has in many cases 
been treated as more or less unlimited with corresponding lack of regulation. Consequences 
have in some cases been dire, including the near extinction of certain species of whales and 
the collapse of the Northern Cod fisheries in Canada and following moratorium in 1992 
(Grafton, 2004) and the collapse of the Atlantic herring stock in the late 60's and 70's. When 
such collapses occur stocks require a long time to bounce back, if they ever do (Hutchings, 
2000). Compared to these horrific examples of overexploitation, the agreements on fishing 
quotas between Russia, Iceland, Norway, the Faroe Islands and the EU may be considered 
rather successful (Ministry of Fisheries and Coastal affairs, 2013a).  
Such evident mismanagement however led to an effort to regulate the industry to prevent 
these things from happening again. Thus the decrease in the number off vessels is due to a 
combination of more regulation, increased efficiency in the fleet and limited quotas.  
An additional reason is that the fishing fleet can be said to have been artificially large due to 
large government subsidies over the years. These subsidies (including tax breaks for 
workers, price controls, direct transfers and refunds of fees paid on fuel) resulted in 
dangerous overexploitation of the common resource capture fisheries are. As the dangers of 
overexploitation became more evident quotas and regulations were implemented in 
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combination with decreased subsidies (Isaksen & Hermansen, 2009). The combined trend 
towards less subsidies and more regulation has persisted ever since, and the number of 
vessels have been in steady decline. A thorough outline and assessment of the different 
regulations and fees faced by the industry can be found in Steinshamn (2008). There is still 
overcapacity in the fleet both internationally and in Norway (Ministry of Fisheries and 
Coastal affairs, 2007). Several studies, among them Pauly et al. (2002) point to a continued 
reduction of all kinds of subsidies to the industry as an integral part of reducing 
overexploitation.  
All these examples are sources to the dire rent dissipation that has plagued fisheries for 
decades. Rent dissipation in a fishery context was first described in Gordon (1954). 
Economic rent is understood as returns that exceed those required to ensure the supply of a 
factor of production (Grafton, 2004). When speaking of natural resources the same concept 
is called "resource rent". Maximum resource rent is obtained by optimising effort and 
harvest as well as stock size. Without regulation, the common property nature of most 
fishery resources and the associated free entry of factor inputs lead to the dissipation of 
resource rent. In cases with dissipation of the resource rent, meaning the suboptimal rent 
generation from a resource, the dissipation is due to mismanagement of the resource 
(Bjørndal, Gordon, & Bezabih, 2013). An article by Willman, Kelleher, Arnason, and Franz 
(2009), aptly named "The sunken Billions", finds a potential maximum resource rent of $ 50 
billion globally from fisheries given optimal management, compared to their estimate of zero 
aggregate rents.  
Even though most fish stocks relevant to Norwegian actors are sustainable in terms of stock 
sizes (Ministry of Fisheries and Coastal affairs, 2007) rent dissipation is still a problem. In 
the case of fisheries where the stock is sustainable there are normally three different sources 
of dissipation related to inputs, these are; input substitution, fleet redundancy and fleet 
composition (Dupont, 1990). Where input substitution occurs when fishermen attempt to 
increase their catches by using more unrestricted inputs in the place of restricted inputs, 
usually vessel size (this is also called capital stuffing in some sources). Fleet redundancy (or 
overcapacity) may be a source of rent dissipation even in cases where access is restricted and 
may occur if the regulator allows more vessels to participate than the optimal number. The 
last source is fleet composition meaning a "suboptimal mix of heterogeneous vessels" where 
government determined catch allocations for each type of vessel allow less efficient vessels 
to continue to fish. The last problem is especially relevant in a Norwegian context where 
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many fisheries are regulated with individual quotas that are not transferable (Bjørndal et al., 
2013). These three factors are all contributors to the dissipation of resource rent in fisheries 
relevant Norway. This goes to show that even in cases with sustainable fish stocks, 
profitability may be low, or indeed zero due to other sources of mismanagement.  
The situation of for the Norwegian fishing fleet is not as dire as these descriptions may lead 
one to believe however, reflecting that Norway has come a long way. According to a recent 
SINTEF report "Verdskapning og sysselsetting i norsk sjømatnæring" (2014) the Norwegian 
seafood industry contributed 46,5 billion NOK to GDP. Where GDP is understood as the 
contribution to GDP understood as the net product value after all costs associated with use 
and services in its production (NOU 2012:16, 2012). This is the reasoning behind the 
difference in estimated total production value and net contribution to GDP. 
The entire sector, including aquaculture, handling and processing, employed over 47.000 
people in 2012 and had a total production value of approx. 156 billion NOK. Capture 
fisheries, including processing and trade/export employed over 24,700 workers. According 
to both Merete Gisvold Sandberg et al. (2014) and Ministry of Fisheries and Coastal Affairs 
(2013b) the industry is able to generate profits in most segments. Also, the industry is very 
important for communities along the coast and therefore still has some subsides in effect, 
ranging from grants from "Innovasjon Norge" (Innovation Norway) to reduced income tax 
for seafarers and indeed the mineral oil tax refund which is discussed here.  
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3. Theory 
We start with an introduction to the climate debate. Here I will present an historical view on 
climate change, give an outline of the mechanisms at play and relationship between the 
release of greenhouse gasses (GHGs) and climate change.  
After these technical sides to the climate debate have been dealt with, I will introduce some 
economic models that are often used to assess the negative externalities that the release of 
GHGs represents. I will also present views on the effects of climate change for current and 
future generations. 
Then I will present a model showing that, by using quotas and fees, authorities can design 
theoretically optimal emissions restrictions. This model has a deterministic form, and shows 
that fees and quotas can give the same economic benefits, but that differing uncertainties and 
information may make different schemes more viable than others given for instance differing 
industry parameters. A model showing how producers and consumers adapt to the scheme 
the authorities implement will also be provided.  
This theory section will inform the analysis and discussion in the following chapters. 
3.1 Emissions, climate change and why there is a price on 
emissions 
The climate has always been changing. The debate we have today should therefore be seen 
through the context of prior changes and variations in the climate. Our planet has over its 
approximately 4,7 years in existence had several major "ice-ages". Between these periods the 
earth's temperature has at some stages been well above the temperatures we see today. 
Scientists have gone so far as to declare that in some periods the earth has been virtually 
snow free (NOU 2006:18, 2006). The current period started about 2,6 million years ago, 
during which the planet has gone through several smaller ice-ages.  
Research from geological surveys, ice-core studies and other biological, chemical and 
physical measures show major changes over the earth's lifespan. Humans as a factor in this 
equation have only been present for about the last 12.000 years however, and we represent a 
possible game changer. Temperatures today are relatively high in a historic perspective, and 
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the impacts of even higher temperatures are unknown but come with dire projections. The 
current pace of temperature change has not been seen before, and the scientific consensus is 
largely that humans are to blame.     
3.1.1 Greenhouse Gases and the Greenhouse effect 
According to the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), greenhouse gases 
(GHGs) are gases that are present in the atmosphere, both natural and anthropogenic which 
absorb thermal infrared radiation, emitted by the Earth’s surface, by the atmosphere itself 
due to the same gases, and by clouds (IPCC, 2013).  
Carbon dioxide (CO2), methane (CH4), water vapor (H2O), nitrous oxide (N2O), and ozone 
(O3) are the most prominent GHGs in the atmosphere. In addition, there are a number of 
entirely man-made ones, such halocarbons and other chlorine and bromine containing 
substances. These substances are largely dealt with in the Montreal Protocol of 1987.  
The Kyoto Protocol of 1997 in addition to dealing with CO2, N2O and CH4, deals with the 
GHGs sulfur hexafluoride (SF6), hydro-fluorocarbons (HFCs) and per-fluorocarbons (PFCs). 
An important distinction between the emissions of greenhouse gases and other forms of 
emissions is that GHGs have a global effect on the environment, whereas other pollutants 
have a mainly local impact. The main focus of this thesis is on GHGs, specifically CO2.  
Because of this distinction, this thesis will be careful not to use the term "pollutants" as a 
description of GHG emissions. Also, from here on, whenever the terms CO2 or GHGs are 
used in the thesis, it is meant as a synonym for CO2 equivalents (CO2e). 
3.1.2 "Normal" and "enhanced" greenhouse effect 
There is a distinction between the "normal" and the "enhanced" greenhouse effect. Even 
though there is consensus among leading scientists that both forms are present, and that the 
concern is off course the latter form, namely the "enhanced" form. Some of the so-called 
climate skeptics seem ignorant of the distinction. The distinction is between the naturally 
occurring, and ever present, "normal" form of greenhouse effect, which is essential to life on 
earth, and the enhanced form, which is the add-on temperature increase caused by mankind's 
industrious efforts to increase production to sustain our ever growing and prospering 
population. 
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The technical reason behind this difference is that the thermal infrared radiation in the 
troposphere is strongly related to the temperature of the atmosphere at the altitude at which it 
is emitted (IPCC, 2013). In short, and sufficient for the scope of this thesis, the explanation 
is that Infrared radiation emitted to space originates from an altitude with a temperature of, 
on average, –19°C, in balance with the net incoming solar radiation, whereas the Earth’s 
surface is kept at a much higher temperature of, on average, +14°C. This is the naturally 
occurring, ever present, and vital effect described above. 
The enhanced, manmade version is generated by the extra release of GHGs from human-
activities. This activity causes increases concentration of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere 
leads to an increased infrared opacity, and therefore to an effective radiation into space from 
a higher altitude at a lower temperature. This causes a "radiative forcing" that leads to an 
enhancement of the greenhouse effect (IPCC, 2013). In other words this manifests itself as 
temperatures rising at a rate that is not natural, or in colloquial terms; in "Global warming". 
According to Le Treut et. al (2007) in their contribution to the fourth IPCC assessment 
report: Climate Change (2007) the earth's temperature would be about -18 °C, compared to 
the average we see today of approximately +14°C, where it not for the greenhouse effect, 
both enhanced and naturally occurring. 
3.1.3 Global warming potential (GWP) 
Furthermore, the IPCC has ranked the six most common GHGs in terms of their global 
warming potential (GWP), my short form of this table is given in table 1 below: 
Global Warming Potential (GWP) of GHGs  (Without climate-carbon feedback) 
Greenhouse gas GWP over 100 years 
Carbon dioxide (CO2) 1 
Methane (CH4) 28 
Nitrous Oxide (N2O) 265 
Hydro-fluorocarbons  (HFCs) 140-11700 
Per-fluorocarbons (PFCs) 6500-9200 
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Sulfur Hexafluoride (SF6) 23900 
Table 1: Source: IPCC, 2013 
The table should be understood as being indexed to the GWP of one metric ton of CO2, it 
follows that one metric ton of Methane has a 28 times higher GWP than one metric ton of 
CO2. This is due to methane having a higher absorption of outgoing radiation.   
3.1.4 Current outlook 
According to the World Energy Outlook 2013 published by the International Energy Agency 
(IEA) the energy-related CO2 emissions is set to rise by 20 percent by 2035, even when they 
take into account all the measures that governments around the world has committed to. This 
leaves the world on a trajectory that will lead to a long-term average temperature increase of 
3.6 C, which is far above the internationally agreed 2°C target (International Energy Agency, 
2013).  
3.1.5 The social cost of carbon 
The social cost of carbon (SCC) is a way to put an economic value to the damages caused by 
a small increase in CO2 emissions, usually one metric ton, in a given year. This number is 
used by governments and international bodies such as the IPCC to estimate the benefits 
associated with reducing emissions, or the damage incurred by its release. Thus this 
monetary value represents the value of damages avoided by reducing CO2 emissions.  
According to the IPCC fourth assessment report (2007) The SCC is meant to be a 
comprehensive estimate of climate change damages and includes, but is not limited to, 
changes in net agricultural productivity, human health, and property damages from increased 
flood risk. The SCC estimates are derived using integrated assessment models. These models 
cannot comprise all of the possible impacts of climate change discussed in the literature due 
to lack of information or unreliable estimates and therefore incorporate high degrees of 
uncertainty. According to K. Arrow et al. (2013) an integrated assessment model can be 
stylized as shown in the figure below: 
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Figure 2: contents of an integrated assessment model (K. Arrow et al., 
2013) 
As figure 2 above shows in an integrated assessment model an estimate of the SCC is 
determined by first transforming projections of economic growth (Y0) into projections of 
greenhouse gas emissions (E0). Then temperature change (T) due to the increase of emissions 
is estimated and this further informs an estimate of associated economic losses D (T) caused 
by those emissions (indirectly due to temperature increase). The feedback effect of reduced 
emissions (E-E0) due to the economic loss is taken into account in some models. According 
to K. Arrow et al. (2013) the SCC is then mathematically defined as the marginal loss of 
social welfare δW caused by an additional ton of carbon dioxide emitted δE, normalized to 
the marginal loss of social welfare caused by one dollar lost in terms of consumption ε. 
It stands to reason that such a comprehensive estimate is subject to large uncertainties and 
thus a topic of discussion. Also as noted by the Interagency Working Group on Social Cost 
of Carbon (2013) appointed by President Obama these models naturally lag behind the most 
recent research. Some argue that the figures provided are too high and others that they are 
too low. The IPCC notes in their report that it is very likely that the social cost of carbon 
underestimates the damages. The graph below shows some of the difference between the 
different models: 
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Figure 3: Projected damages as share of global GDP from different models 
(Richard L. Revesz et al., 2014) 
These considerable differences in projected damages in turn influences the estimated 
monetary value set to the SCC. Table 2 shows some of the more recent estimates of SCC and 
the models they are based on. 
 
Table 2: Different estimates of the social cost of carbon (K. Arrow et al., 
2013; NOU 2012:16, 2012; Richard L. Revesz et al., 2014) 
The key takeaway here is that even though each model has a different approach and there is 
a wide range of uncertainties, all the models predict huge economic damages from GHG 
emissions for warming beyond 2 °C above pre-industrial levels. According to Richard L. 
Revesz et al. (2014) two newer models "ENVISAGE" and "CRED", published after the US 
analysis was structured in 2010, give about the same projections. The authors further sum up 
by saying that across all the models they have reviewed, depending on assumptions about 
how future damages are valued in today’s money, "the expected global cost of one tone of 
carbon dioxide emitted in 2020 is between $ 12 and $ 64, with $ 43 as the central value". 
Also, Richard Tol gives an average value of $ 50 from his meta-study from 2005 (Richard S. 
Source Modell SCC ($/metric ton) Base year
Arrow et. al (2014) Summary 43$                                2020
US government (2013) FUND, DICE, PAGE 37$                                2015
US government (2010) FUND, DICE, PAGE 24$                                2015
Nordhaus (2010) RICE 30$                                2020
Bastianin mfl. (2010) WITCH 22$                                2020
Tol (2009) FUND 55$                                2020
Paltsev mfl. (2009) EPPA 75$                                2020
Bosetti mfl. (2009) WITCH 38$                                2020
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J. Tol, 2005). Interestingly, he points out that peer-reviewed articles often provide lower 
estimates of the social cost of carbon than do governmental studies and numbers provided by 
advocacy groups. 
3.1.6 Uncertain damage estimates 
The costs associated with climate change could be even higher than the social costs and 
discussion given above indicate. There are several reasons for this; the first being that 
societies and economies may be more vulnerable to climate change than the models are able 
to predict. According to Richard L. Revesz et al. (2014) the models factor in average weather 
changes but not increasing variations in weather. Severe draughts or floods and the impacts 
these may have is therefore not represented. Also, some crops are less resistant to weather 
conditions than others. Some crops may decline rapidly over a certain temperature. If a 
country or region is highly dependent on this crop there may be extreme economic effects 
due to famines, diseases and war that the models do not encompass. Hsiang, Burke, and 
Miguel (2013) take an even more somber view, mentioning the risks of governments being 
overthrown, wars, economic crises and societal collapse as a result of changing climate.  
Also, the models largely exclude the damages related to climate change when it comes to 
labor productivity, productivity growth, and to the value of the capital stock. The models are 
static, if a decreasing annual growth rate was introduced due to climate change; the damages 
could have larger effects on the global economy than the models currently take into account. 
This compounding "lost growth" may represent a substantial decline in welfare (Fankhauser 
& S.J. Tol, 2005; Richard S.J. Tol, 2011).  
Richard S.J. Tol (2011) and Sterner and Persson (2008) mention that as resources become 
more scarce their value increases. This is also a shortfall related to the models being static. 
Because the benefit the resources yields is likely to decline as warming degrades them, the 
costs of future damage from climate change will rise faster than the models predict (K. 
Arrow et al., 2013). 
Last, several prominent researchers, perhaps most notably Weitzman and the Stern review, 
have noted that the models use constant discount rates to give an estimate of present value of 
the damages. They argue that for impacts that are both highly uncertain and occurring in the 
distant future a declining discount rate should be used. They reason in different ways, 
Weitzman viewing the issue as a form of "insurance", while Stern emphasizes the 
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uncertainty aspect but arrive at roughly the same conclusion: the discount rate should 
decline. This would give a much higher present value long-term damages and therefore a 
higher value for the social cost of carbon (Stern, 2007; Martin L. Weitzman, 1998; Martin L 
Weitzman, 2007). Nordhaus (2007) disagrees with this and promotes high discount rates 
based on the current markets ability to handle the high social cost of carbon, and also cites 
the fact that we have poor people now that need help. If future generations are to be richer 
anyway, he sees no reason for them to benefit even more by reducing emissions now. 
To Nordhous' credit, it is true those future generations may be richer and that technological 
improvements might equip them to cope with climate change. But according to K. Arrow et 
al. (2013) the bulk of the literature and arguments indicate that social-cost models are 
under-estimating climate-change harms. 
The type of cost/benefit analysis that the discussion about discount rates implies that known 
benefits and costs of a project should be converted to consumption units and discounted to 
the present at the consumption rate of interest, i.e. the rate at which society would trade 
consumption in a future year t for consumption now. From the Ramsey–Cass–Koopmans 
model one can under certain assumptions (social planner who wishes to maximize social 
welfare of society etc.), which simplifies the picture substantially, derive the "Ramsey 
condition", where the discount rate applied to net benefits at time t, ρt, equals the sum of the 
utility rate of discount (δ) and the rate of growth in consumption between t and the present 
(gt), weighted by (minus) the elasticity of marginal utility of consumption (η) (Fankhauser & 
S.J. Tol, 2005): 
       
Most climate scientists agree that this is a useful conceptual framework for examining 
intergenerational discounting, but they disagree on how to determine the parameters (δ) and 
(η) (Stern, 2007). 
One further speaks of a prescriptive and descriptive approach. The prescriptive approach is 
to view the parameters (δ) and (η) as representing policy choices whereas the descriptive 
approach is to base the estimates of (δ) and (η) on market rates of return.  
Those who favor the prescriptive approach argue that the parameters could be based on 
ethical principles, public policy decisions or social preferences. Stern (2006), for example, 
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argues that it is ethically indefensible to discount the utility of future generations, except 
possibly to take account of the fact that these generations may not exist. This implies that 
δ=0, or a number that reflects the probability that future generations will not be alive. Stern 
assumes that the hazard rate of extinction is 0.1% per year.  
The parameter η determines how fast the marginal utility of consumption declines as 
consumption increases. According to Dasgupta (2008) it can be understood as a measure of 
intertemporal inequality aversion. This means that it reflects the maximum sacrifice one 
generation should make to transfer income to the next generation. Those who favor the 
descriptive approach (Nordhouse (2007) among them) suggest that η (or ρ itself) could be 
inferred from the financial markets. Although they recognize that, even for longer term 
assets such as 30-year bonds, behavior in financial markets is likely to reflect 
intragenerational than intergenerational preferences. 
Positive effects 
While most researchers hold the view that, when all effects are added up, the result will be a 
net negative, there are also some positive effects that may materialize. Among these positive 
effects are the opening of the northern passages, the Northern Sea Route and the Northwest 
Passage which can decrease shipping distances substantially and therefore also the costs and 
emissions associated with international shipping. Also, there might be benefits to global food 
production as land farther north becomes arable. These areas may have the potential to 
supply more food than is done today (Parry, Rosenzweig, Iglesias, Livermore, & Fischer, 
2004). Richard Tol (R. S. Tol, 2002a, 2002b) states that an increase of 1°C in the average 
global surface temperature will have, on balance a positive effect for the OECD, China and 
the Middle East (and a negative effect for other countries). In that case the problem becomes 
more an issue of how the benefits of climate change are distributed. It should be noted that 
Tol still puts a price to emissions (Richard S. J. Tol, 2005).  
3.1.7 Disclaimer 
This thesis will not discuss differing opinions on the effects of GHGs building up in the 
atmosphere. In these matters it will side with the stance of the IPCC, saying that the 
enhanced greenhouse effect caused by human activities is to be viewed as a force with 
potentially dire consequences.  
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3.2 Optimal emissions restrictions  
To reach economic efficiency in production, Diamond and Mirrlees (1971a, 1971b) showed 
that inputs should not be taxed. They maintain that it will not be efficient to implement taxes 
that would cause different sectors and producers to face differing factor prices. Or, perhaps 
even more politically controversial implementing taxes that distort the price relationship 
between imported and domestically produced goods.  
Diamond and Mirrlees maintained however, that taxes should be implemented to correct for 
the externalities of production. The environmental taxes strive to be in this category. These 
taxes may ideally be seen as furthering efficiency because they see to that consumer’s factor 
in all costs that society has to bear because of the production and consumption of a product. 
According to the writers of NOU2009:16 (NOU 2009:16, 2009) Diamond and Mirrlees 
builds on very strict assumptions. But the group still holds the view that it is difficult to see 
any economically founded reasons for taxes being used to shift the factor intensity between 
producers and sectors, if this is not on the basis of correcting externalities.  
Another classical example is Ramsey (1927) which states that to reach economic efficiency 
in consumption, taxes should be levied in markets where the allocation will be least affected. 
This is called the Ramsey principle for optimal taxation (Norman & Orvedal, 2010). It states 
that the efficiency loss is least when a tax is implemented on goods where a change in price 
leads to small changes in demand, or in other words in markets where the demand and 
supply elasticities are low and the sum of cross price effects are low (NOU 2009:16, 2009).  
These examples are however not set in stone. NOU2009:16 uses the example of diapers for 
children to illustrate this point. It is unlikely that parents of small children will consume 
fewer diapers even if prices increase. According to the Ramsey principle this should then be 
a relevant item for taxation. But, we also know that parents with small children, in many 
cases, are relatively poor. So, implementation of such a tax may not be politically, or indeed 
morally, acceptable.   
When it comes to the regulation of GHG emissions there are both the costs of measures and 
the benefits of avoided damage to consider. The relationships between these two are 
illustrated in figure 5. Here we see the quantity of pollution on the x-axis and the benefits or 
"value" represented on the y-axis. An efficient level of pollution is here defined by using the 
concept of Pareto efficiency, which is defined as an outcome being efficient if it is not 
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possible to make someone better off without making someone else worse off (Grafton, 
2004). This efficiency term does of course not imply that pollution is in any way desirable.  
The efficient level of the pollutant shown in figure 5 is found at the intersect of the marginal 
cost of abatement curve and the marginal benefit of abatement cost curve. This is where the 
marginal cost of reducing or abating pollution exactly equals the marginal benefit of 
abatement. The marginal benefit further represents the reduction in the MEC associated with 
the pollution.  
To give the standard example of this concept provided in both Grafton (2004) and Pindyck 
and Rubinfeld (2005) one can think of a factory that pollutes a river, affecting (imposing 
costs on) the users of the water downstream. The cost imposed on the downstream users is a 
negative externality that the factory upstream is oblivious to. The fact that the factory does 
not factor in this cost negatively affects the utility or production function of other actors in 
the market. Reductions in the pollution from the factory, that will reduce the cost incurred by 
the downstream actors, represents the benefits associated with abatement. The cost of 
abatements represents the expense to the factory associated with implementing measures to 
reduce pollution. Factoring in these aspects one can derive the efficient level of pollution 
indicated in the figure below:  
 
Figure 4: Efficient level of pollution adapted from (Grafton, 2004) 
The key takeaway here is that just as the level of pollution can be too high, the level of 
pollution abatement can also be too high if the benefits of reducing the pollution is less than 
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the cost of taking such measures. It follows that for many, perhaps even most, pollutants the 
efficient level will be positive.   
Another possibility, not illustrated here, is when the marginal external cost is greater than 
any marginal cost of abatement. If this is the case, the marginal external cost curve will be 
greater than the marginal cost of abatement for all pollution levels, leading to an efficient 
level of pollution equal to zero. 
3.2.1 Stock and flow pollutants 
The example above is of a flow pollutant, where an efficient level of pollution can be 
derived when the marginal benefits of pollution control equals the marginal cost of abating, 
and is defined as some fixed level of emissions per unit of time. The efficient level of a stock 
pollutant on the other hand, is not generally fixed but rather a function whose value will 
change over time (Grafton, 2004). The definitions of stock and flow pollutants, respectively, 
from Grafton (2004) are: 
 Stock pollutant: Pollutants whose effects accumulate over time and dissipate slowly 
 Flow Pollutant: Pollutants whose effects are only felt at the time of discharge and 
can be readily assimilated by the environment. 
Because this thesis concerns CO2, which is a stock pollutant the explanation above may 
seem irrelevant, but I feel it serves as a good explanation of the general concepts involved in 
emissions reduction. 
3.2.2 Externalities and market failures  
Markets, in spite of all their benefits, sometimes need to be regulated or controlled. 
Authorities and policy makers largely aim to provide regulations that are fair and efficient to 
correct market failures when they arise.  
Negative externalities associated with emissions are a typical example of a market failure. 
Even though there seem to be potential benefits to all parties involved in reducing emissions, 
research has shown that these cost-efficient measures often gets blocked by different market 
barriers. Chiefly among them is perhaps a lack of reliable information in addition to 
technical and market failures. Where, lack of information makes investment decisions in new 
technology uncertain as standards and regulations are unclear. Technical barriers happen 
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when for instance ship-owners do not have confidence in a solutions ability to provide the 
cost reduction promised. Market failures can typically arise from divergent incentives, for 
instance if the party that pays for an efficiency measure does not get the benefits of the 
associated fuel savings or, if private capital to invest in low-carbon technologies cannot be 
obtained. Ways to overcome market barriers could drive the adoption of cost effective 
measures without compromising profitability (Grafton, 2004; Pindyck & Rubinfeld, 2005). 
The authorities and policy makers typically have the following major options and measures 
to correct these failures and barriers; taxes; fees; penalties; prohibitions; quotas; regulating 
consumption, production or the use of certain resources; giving direct or indirect subsidies to 
production, employment, investments etc.; customs; and export subsidies in addition to 
several other more subtle ways of trying to facilitate efficient markets.  
The following section will present the concept of externalities and economic theories 
concerning the correction of market failures.   
3.2.3 Externalities 
According Grafton (2004) externalities can be defined as: "The result of an activity that 
causes incidental benefits or damages to others with no corresponding compensation 
provided to or paid by those who generate the externality". This compensation is usually 
understood as a price mechanism. These externalities can further be positive or negative, 
determined by whether the action of one party results on benefits for other parties or imposes 
costs on other parties (Pindyck & Rubinfeld, 2005). 
As these externalities are not compensated for, and as such is not reflected in market prices 
they are often viewed as sources of economic inefficiency, where a state of economic 
efficiency is defined as when: Maximum output is produced for the inputs used, and inputs 
are allocated to minimize costs for any output level (Grafton, 2004). The source of 
inefficiency in this thesis would be that the price of inputs in the efficiency maxim is wrong 
because it does not factor in the damage of emissions, and thus the allocation of inputs is 
wrong and the ideal of economic efficiency cannot hold. The following chart shows the costs 
of externalities.  
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Figure 5: the concept of negative externalities from Pindyck and Rubinfeld 
(2005) 
As figure 5 illustrates; in cases where negative externalities are present, the marginal cost 
curve for a firm does not reflect the actual cost of production, denoted marginal social cost 
(MSC). This leads to the MSC of production being higher than the marginal cost (MC) of 
production currently faced by the representative firm.  
The difference between the curves is the marginal external cost (MEC). This cost is not felt 
by the producer, and thus the profit-maximizing firm will disregard this cost (the externality) 
and therefore produces more (q1) than the efficient output (q*). 
To correct this imbalance either price of inputs and the corresponding market price has to 
change to reflect the social cost of production (factoring in the externality), which will lead 
to a smaller quantity demanded or, the quantity produced must be curtailed by other 
measures.  
The following section will present the simplest theoretic solution (several assumptions have 
to hold) to resolving externality problems; introducing a Pigouvian tax. 
3.2.4 Taxes and economic theory 
To avoid the resulting ineffective equilibrium and corresponding excessive pollution from 
market failures, a Pigouvian tax can be introduced. These taxes are named after the 
economist A. C. Pigou who first argued for their use in the 1920's (Grafton, 2004). Pigou 
 33 
was the first to suggest the theoretical possibility of correcting negative externalities by 
taxing the activities that cause these externalities directly. Because these taxes are set equal 
to the MEC they do not lead to economic inefficiency and loss such as other taxes do. 
According to Norman and Orvedal (2010) taxes normally lead to ineffective shifts in 
allocation of resources. Instead, by correcting market failures, Pigouvian taxes lead to gains.  
Pigouvian taxes works by adding a tax t* per unit of emissions, where t* is equal to the MEC 
for the individual firm. The result is that the allocation of resources and prices in the market 
is brought closer to the optimal market solution. Indeed given a perfectly competitive market 
and under the assumption that authorities have perfect information one can reach the 
theoretically efficient market solution. Thus levying the correct tax directly on the source can 
lead to an optimal equilibrium. This is shown in figure 7 below.        
 
Figure 6: Illustration of a Pigouvian tax from Pindyck and Rubinfeld (2005) 
Figure 6 shows the tax set equal to the MEC. This leads to the firms' marginal cost curve 
(MC) shifting upward. The resulting MSC curve is equal to the firms marginal cost plus the 
tax. To reach the new equilibrium dictated by the intersect of the fixed price curve and the 
firms' MSC, the firm has to adjust its output. The firm reduces its output from q1 to q* units, 
which reflects the optimal market solution in this case.  
It should be noted that it is difficult to find the correct tax, most argue that it is only a 
theoretical possibility (Grafton, 2004). Also, Pigouvian taxes are very different than fees, 
and these two terms should not be mixed.  Pigouvian taxes require perfect information and 
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are a form of a direct regulation, taxing the source of pollution (in our case) directly. The 
perfect information criterion further implies that we know the outcome of the regulation, a 
very strong assumption. Fees on the other hand, are determined with less market information 
(no assumption of perfect information); the outcome of a fee is therefore more uncertain and 
can be subject to several moderating and subjective factors such as political interest etc. 
Pigouvian taxes are by their nature objective, factoring in only the unbiased marginal 
external cost to reflect the true cost in the market. This is why these taxes often are held as 
the ideal of a regulation, rather than being a practical solution.  
3.2.5 Direct and indirect regulation  
To correct for market failures authorities have several means at their disposal. An important 
distinction between these means is whether they are direct or indirect.  
3.2.6.1 Direct regulation  
Direct means, in the case of emissions, are largely centered on prohibitions, quotas and 
injunctions. These measures have in common that they specify specifically for any actors in 
the market either what they must do or what the consequences, or costs, of their actions will 
be. Examples here can be when the authorities regulate the emissions from an activity 
directly or specifically banns a substance, such as the ban on using chlorofluorocarbon 
gasses (CFC gasses) in refrigerators.  
Direct measures attract popular criticism because the enforcement of them usually incurs 
administrative costs related to monitoring the adherence to the regulation. In addition such 
measures may not be effective in either cost-terms or economic terms because they force 
actors to behave in certain ways rather than giving the actor the opportunity to decide the 
most efficient solution for their needs. The fact that these are often "blanket measures" 
(applies to all parties equally) strengthens this inefficiency. 
An extreme example of a direct measure related to this thesis would be if the Norwegian 
government, aiming to reach national emission targets, mandated that all ships operating in 
Norwegian territorial waters had to switch to liquid natural gas (LNG) as fuel. This measure 
would not be cost-efficient as cost-efficiency of a measure depends on whether the measure 
is the cheapest way to reduce national emissions or not.  
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As with the Pigouvian tax example above, direct measures can be made more efficient if the 
authorities have good information about marginal external costs, market participants and 
differences between segments of the market. The last point about differences between 
segments of a market is relevant to this thesis as it is the basis for the reasoning behind the 
government exempting smaller commercial fishing vessels from paying CO2 tax on fuel.  
3.2.6.1 Indirect regulation  
Contrary to the direct measures described above, indirect measures aim to incentivize 
desirable behavior from actors in the market. It is often referred to as the "market 
mechanism" as it corrects failures by assigning costs to the negative externalities or benefits 
to positive externalities and thus, ideally, drive firms and other actors towards choosing the 
optimal solution (Pindyck & Rubinfeld, 2005). Among the examples of indirect measures 
are fees per unit of emission, subsidies, tradable emission permits or deposits incentivizing 
certain behavior such as the Norwegian "plastic bottle recycling scheme". 
3.2.6 Fees and quotas 
This section will focus on a firms’ marginal cost of abatement (MCA) and its relation to 
marginal social costs (MSC) and how one can elicit the optimal level of emissions by either 
quotas or fees. Figure 7 below illustrates this relationship. Here the same logic as for the factory 
mentioned in earlier applies. The factory produces something, say; a car, and in the course of this 
effort releases some polluting substance into the river. The firm has options available to them to 
reduce the emissions, but there is a cost associated with it.   
 
Figure 7: The relationship between fees and quotas (Pindyck & Rubinfeld, 
2005) 
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We assume that the firm is profit-maximizing and that it therefore has chosen its preferred 
emission amount based on the costs and benefits it is faced with. The MSC curve slopes 
upward due to the marginal social cost of the pollution increasing as the externality is 
compounded. The MCA curve slopes downward due to the cost of reducing emissions being 
low when the level of emissions is high and high when emissions are low to begin with. 
3.2.7 Fees  
The authorities can implement a fee equal to P* per unit emitted. If emission levels are 
above E*, the MCA faced by the firm is less than the emission fee. The response of the 
profit-maximizing factory in our case would then be to minimize its costs by reducing its 
emissions quantity to the optimal level indicated by E*. If the level of emissions are below 
E* the MCA would be higher than the emission fee, the factory would then have no incentive 
to reduce its emissions, preferring instead to pay the fees on its current level. 
Fees will generally bring certainty to the cost of abatement but leave the reduction level of 
emissions uncertain. 
3.2.8 Quotas  
A quota works by specifying the amount of emissions that our factory is allowed to release. 
The factory would incur great costs or penalties if it exceeds the limit. The quota would be 
set equal to the optimal level of emissions E*. To meet these demands the factory has to 
invest in abatement measures to avoid the penalties, which would cause the average 
production costs of the factory to increase. This should in theory lead the factory to produce 
its economically efficient output as defined above. If the price the factory can get for its 
products in the market is higher than the average cost of production, including the abatement 
cost (and also providing a reasonable return on capital) the factory will stay in business. If 
the cost of production, including the abatement cost, is higher than the market price the 
factory would shut down. 
3.2.9 Quotas and fees compared 
Hoel and Karp (2002) state in their article that asymmetric information plays an important 
role in environmental regulation because the emitter usually knows more than the 
government about its abatement cost function. When this information asymmetry is present 
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in the market, the first-best optimum can seldom be reached by the use of taxes or quotas. 
With the "first- best optimum" being the formal term for the solution "that equates the 
marginal abatement costs of the pollutants and the marginal environmental damage" (Hoel & 
Karp, 2002). 
It follows that the comparative strengths of quotas versus fees depends on the authorities’ 
access to information and the costs of controlling the emissions (Hoel & Karp, 2002; 
Pindyck & Rubinfeld, 2005; Martin L Weitzman, 1974). In practice fees are often considered 
the most viable option as it achieves the same level of emission reduction at a lower cost 
than the equal per-firm emissions quota (Grafton, 2004), especially policy makers seem to 
hold this view (Martin L Weitzman, 1974). According to Martin L Weitzman (1974) the two 
deciding factors for this observation is: 
1. In real life quotas, for practical reasons, often have to be applied to all firms equally. 
In this case, not needing the same level of supervision, a fee will result in the same 
total reduction but at a lower cost. The fee will lower the relative production cost of 
firms with low MCA compared to firms with high MCA. This results in a more 
efficient output and allocation of resources than quotas.  
2. Introducing a fee incentives investment in equipment that allows the firm to reduce 
its emissions. This may lead to technological progress as an added benefit. Quotas 
only reduce emissions by limiting production, there are no incentives to reduce 
emissions beyond this as the firm will not benefit.  
If however we are faced with an industry where the marginal social cost curve is very steep 
in addition to the marginal cost of abatement curve being relatively flat, quotas may be the 
preferred measure. Also if, as is often the case in the real world, there is incomplete 
information the introduction of quotas will give more certain emissions levels. This will 
however make the costs of abatement uncertain (Martin L Weitzman, 1974).  
3.2.10 Transferable Emissions Permits 
A third and popular measure that can be used to moderate the existence of market failures is 
a so called "cap and trade scheme". According to Grafton (2004) a cap and trade scheme is 
an emission permit trading program where an overall cap or total level of emissions is set by 
a regulator and permits are allocated to polluters who are allowed to trade permits among 
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themselves. One example of such a measure in practice is the European Union Emissions 
Trading Scheme (EU ETS) which will be outlined briefly later.  
The cap and trade schemes are inspired by the Nobel Laureate in Economics Ronald Coase's 
contribution to understanding how property rights and transaction costs can mitigate 
inefficiencies associated with technological externalities (Grafton, 2004). This concept is 
called the Coase theorem, and states that if property rights are defined, given certain 
conditions then, regardless of how these property rights was initially distributed, liabilities or 
legal entitlements, the parties that are affected by an externality will bargain and negotiate 
between themselves and arrive at an efficient outcome (Norman & Orvedal, 2010). 
The conditions to ensure this result is that there is zero costs attached to the negotiations and 
bargaining, there is no strategic behavior in the bargaining, all parties have perfect 
information, and that the initial distribution of rights does not affect the marginal valuation 
of resources or assets (Grafton, 2004). 
This logic appeals to business and free market minded individuals as it is radically different 
than the traditional command and control approaches used by governments with all the faults 
associated with these approaches. Because, as is often the mantra in the US; the government 
is very bad at picking winners. And as we have seen above neither quotas nor fees are likely 
to produce efficient outcomes in situations with imperfect information. The cap and trade 
approach leaves this to market dynamics by decentralizing the resolution for externalities to 
the affected parties, as it is assumed that these have the most available information to resolve 
the issue efficiently (Grafton, 2004).  Also Martin L Weitzman (1974) says that this may be 
a good solution from a theoretical point of view, especially in industries where output is 
more or less identical. He however cautions that the basic problem stands; is it better to fix 
the total amount by a quantity or using a price control option.   
In practice a simple system of tradable permits can be distributed among firms equal to the 
maximum amount of emissions that can be generated. This efficiently creates a market for 
externalities (Pindyck & Rubinfeld, 2005). This approach combines the simplicity of a quota 
system with the cost advantages of a fee system. This works by the cap serving as an 
effective "quota" and the trading mechanism allows abatement to be done at the lowest cost 
as in the case of an optimal fee system.  
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As mentioned cap and trade systems mimics these features and work in practice by 
authorities auctioning off a fixed number of emissions permits to firms and other actors that 
are willing to bid. The firms also have the opportunity to trade between themselves. One 
permit could for instance be equal to one metric ton of CO2, as is the case in the EU ETS. A 
company that manages to reduce its emissions can either sell the spare permits to other 
companies thus offsetting the costs of the reduction or "store" the permits for use at a later 
date. This flexibility, in line with the basic theory outlined above, will lead to cost-efficient 
emissions cuts, with abatements taking place where it is cheapest/most effective, and those 
who cannot reduce at a reasonable cost still have to pay for the externalities they cause as 
they have to buy permits for the emissions in excess of their initial "allowance".  
As the authorities decide the quantity of permits that are in the market at any given time, or 
the "cap", they can regulate the market and reduce the amount of available permits over time 
to inspire further abatement. This last point has proved a problem as there are currently too 
many permits in the EU ETS due to high initial allocations and due to companies being able 
to hoard and store cheap permits. One possible amendment to this problem is expiration 
dates on the permits as this would force companies to either use them or sell them off within 
a reasonable timeframe. 
The example in figure 8 outlined in Babiker, Reilly, and Viguier (2004) illustrates the 
benefits and allocations in a simple system of tradable permits, without distortions, between 
firms.  
 
Figure 8: Tradable Permits (Babiker et al., 2004) 
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Figure 8 shows the marginal cost of emission reduction for firm 1 (MCA1) and firm 2 
(MCA2). The MCAT is the total marginal abatement cost and corresponding reduction 
quantity realized with the trading scheme in place. The initial situation assumes that the 
firms have limits on their allowed emissions, so that emissions have to be reduced without 
emission trading by Q, where Q is the combined reduction target for the two firms (Q1,Q2) 
such that Q1+Q2=Q, and where Q1=Q2. As the figure illustrates, the marginal cost of 
abatement at Q is higher for firm 1 than for firm 2. This is because P1>P2, where P1 and P2 is 
the marginal abatement costs (or carbon prices) in their individual markets. 
If an international emission trading regime is then implemented, marginal costs of abatement 
can be equalized across the two firms. The optimal reduction levels in the two firms are 
given by the combined quantity labeled Q* and the corresponding marginal cost of 
abatement, with trade, is P* in both markets. Now, given the ability to trade permits, it is 
beneficial for firm 1 to reduce its emissions by Q1T and buying emission permits from firm 2, 
whereas firm 2 benefits from reduces emissions by Q2T and selling permits to firm 1. As 
shown in Figure 8, the two firms are better off with emission trading compared to the 
situation as is was before. The net income gains are equal to area A for firm 1 and to area B 
for firm 2 (Babiker et al., 2004).  
The EU ETS may be a possible contender for the best way to regulate emissions in shipping 
together with more direct and less complicated measures like a fee paid "at the pump".  
3.2.8.1 A short note on Transferable Emissions Permits vs. Pigouvian 
taxes 
The same outcome as illustrated in figure 9 can theoretically come about if a Pigouvian tax is 
implemented. The problem with these taxes is that given the assumption of a growing 
economy (or indeed an economy in recession) the tax would have to be adjusted very 
frequently to have optimal effect (Pindyck & Rubinfeld, 2005). This is not possible in 
practice, and the costs associated with trying are likely to be too high. Without these 
adjustments and without taking in other effects such as inflation the effects of the tax will 
eventually be eroded and it will lose its effect. Thus the Pigouvian tax must be said to be far 
less precise with regards to quantity in practice than permits. The price of permits however, 
will due to market mechanisms follow the general price level. Also, given a market for 
permits when the economy grows the price permits will increase accordingly, reflecting the 
relative scarcity of the rights to emit (Grafton, 2004). 
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3.3 Determining an environmental tax 
Naturally using the criteria given above green taxes or fees can take many forms, and a more 
specific definition may be needed. Many taxes may be labeled "green" by the authorities, 
according to Sandmo (2009) the OECD defines taxes as green if they are levied on tax bases 
that are correlated with adverse environmental effects. This correlation can however take 
many forms, therefore the labeling of taxes as "green" or not is largely at the discretion of 
those who implement it. And, as everyone knows, correlation is not the same as causation. 
To illustrate these problems Sandmo (2009) uses a selection of the different taxes imposed 
on cars; the tax on car ownership (annual fee), petrol tax and taxes related to road use.  
All these taxes have weaknesses. The tax on ownership has no effect on car use in the short 
run as it is fixed regardless of use, but may have long run effects leading to less cars being 
bought overall. The tax on petrol varies with use and may as such be a better environmental 
tax. It still has some limitations however as it does not discriminate between what the car is 
used for and when it is used (e.g. at congested times of day or not). According to Sandmo 
(2009) the taxes that has the closest resemblance to the Pigouvian tax is the taxes on road 
use. Here there is a chance to tax more congested roads higher than others, vary the charge 
with time of day. Another such tax is a congestion charge, like the one in London.  
The key to setting such taxes is that they should reflect the difference between social and 
private marginal cost, as discussed above, where the difference represents the price of the 
damage caused by the externality. How to determine this amount is very difficult and has to 
be determined on empirical grounds, ideally tailored to each particular case.  
3.3.1 Double dividends 
According to Goulder (1995) another potential benefit of environmental taxes is that in 
addition to correcting negative externalities, they also generate revenue for the government 
without leading to the inefficiencies generally associated with taxes in an efficient market 
system. Thus, substituting the normal income and commodity taxes with environmental 
taxes should in theory be able to generate the same revenue for the authorities as before but 
at a lower social cost, i.e. in a more efficient way. This is the so-called "double 
dividend"(Goulder, 1995).  
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One would expect that this double dividend would make environmental taxes widely used. 
But this is not the case in real life(Sandmo, 2009). There are several reasons for this, some of 
which will be discussed in more detail. 
3.4 The incidence of a tax 
The effectiveness of an environmental tax depends on who bears the cost of said tax, the tax 
incidence, and whether it has the intended consequences when it comes to lessened input 
factor intensity, decreased total consumption of a good or incentivizes investment in new 
equipment.  
The current tax on CO2 emissions is a specific tax. In other words it is a tax of a certain 
amount of money per unit (of fuel) sold, which follows the definition of specific taxes in 
Pindyck and Rubinfeld (2005). If the burden of the tax is split equally between suppliers and 
consumers we have the situation described in figure 10 below.  
 
Figure 9: Incidence of a tax (Pindyck & Rubinfeld, 2005) 
In figure 9 the tax is shared equally by the suppliers and the consumers. In effect the 
consumer price Pb rises with half the tax and the supplier price Ps is cut by half the tax. This 
solution requires four conditions to hold (Pindyck & Rubinfeld, 2005).  
1. The quantity sold and the consumer price Pb has to be on the demand curve: 
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QD = QD(Pb) 
2. The quantity sold and the supplier price Ps has to be on the supply curve: 
QS = QS(Ps) 
3. Quantity demanded must equal the quantity supplied (Q1): 
QD = QS 
4. The difference between Pb and Ps must be equal to the tax t: 
Pb − Ps = t 
By estimating the demand curve Q
D
 (Pb) and the supply curve Q
S
 (Ps) and knowing the tax t, 
these equations can be solved for the consumer price Pb, the supplier price Ps and total 
quantity demanded. Here Pb is the price that consumers have to pay. Ps is the price that the 
suppliers receive. P0 is the price that would clear the market without the tax. Consumers will 
lose A+B, suppliers will lose D+C while the government earns A+D in revenue from the tax. 
B+C represent the deadweight loss associated with this very generic scheme.  
3.4.1 Who bears the burden of the tax? 
In the case in figure 10 the burden of the tax is shared equally by consumers and suppliers. 
In the real world however the elasticities of demand and supply vary with the good in 
question. These differences in elasticities have huge effects on who bears the burden of a tax. 
Consider the figure below showing two different cases, one with very an inelastic demand 
and relatively elastic supply curve, and the other vice versa: 
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Figure 10: Impact of taxes depends on the elasticities of supply and 
demand(Pindyck & Rubinfeld, 2005) 
Figure 10 shows that if demand is relatively inelastic and supply is relatively elastic the 
burden of the tax will fall mostly on consumers. This is easy to see from the graph to the left. 
A reduction in demand requires a relatively large change in price, whereas a reduction in 
supply only requires a small price change. This is a typical situation for addictive goods such 
as cigarettes. Sumner and Wohlgenant (1985) showed that a tax on cigarettes is mostly taken 
up by consumers due to the relatively inelastic demand of this product (about -0.4). The 
figure to the left shows the opposite case, which may be more relevant to the issues of this 
paper.  
According to Pindyck and Rubinfeld (2005) the benefit of this relationship is that we can say 
something about the likely tax incidence without resorting to deriving elasticities for the 
entire supply and demand curves, which in many cases can be difficult. We can estimate 
roughly who will bear the burden of the tax using only a small range of elasticities or point 
elasticities. In most cases a tax will fall mostly on the consumer if Ed/Es is small and mostly 
on the supplier if the Ed/Es is large. This gives us the "pass-through formula"(Pindyck & 
Rubinfeld, 2005): 
  
       
                       
Where Ed is the elasticity of demand and Es is the elasticity of supply. The formula gives us 
the fraction of the tax that is passed through to producers in the form of higher prices. Table 
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3 below shows how much of a tax the producer has to bear with different combinations of 
elasticities of supply and demand.   
 
Table 3: Suppliers share of a tax with different elasticities 
To sum up, we need the price elasticity of both supply and demand to determine how the 
burden of the mineral oil tax will be divided between the actors in the market. This will be 
dealt with later. There is of course also the opportunity for either customers or the supplier to 
avoid paying the tax to consider. 
  
Perfectly inelastic Inelastic Unity inelastic Elastic
0 -0,5 -1 2
Perfectly inelastic 0 0 -100 % -100 % -100 %
Inelastic 0,5 0 -50 % -67 % -80 %
Unity inelastic 1 0 -33 % -50 % -67 %
Elastic 2 0 -20 % -33 % -50 %
Suppliers share of a tax with different elasticities
Demand Curve
Supply curve
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4. Analysis 
First, in order to evaluate the Norwegian CO2 mineral oil tax one the governments stated 
goals for the development of the industries should be given account for and discussed in 
context with the governments goals for reducing CO2 emissions. This approach will provide 
a framework for evaluating both the economic, political and environmental aspects of the 
effort to reduce emissions by reducing the refund of the tax on mineral oil.   
4.1 Climate and CO2-reduction goals 
Over the years the Norwegian government has developed its foundations for how to evaluate 
climate policies. The principal document for how the climate policy is conducted today is the 
report "A climate friendly Norway" (NOU 2006:18, 2006), which has been updated and 
refined ever since. Based on this report and others wide support was given to the government 
resolution "klimaforliket" or "climate agreement" (Innst. S.nr. 145 (2007–2008)). The latest 
set of principles for evaluating climate policies in Norway is found in the "Norwegian 
Climate Policy" report No.21 to the Parliament (2011-2012) (Ministry of Climate and 
Environment, 2012). The frameworks used in these reports are in turn based on the report 
NOU 2012:16 "Economic Analysis" (NOU 2012:16, 2012) published by the Department of 
Finance. These evaluations have in turn led to the sustainability goals defined in the national 
budgets ever since 2012 (Ministry of Finance, 2011, 2013a). The principles, goals and result 
parameters are as follows:  
Fair distribution 
The government states that according to our foundational values there should be a fair 
distribution between those living today and future generations. The government will 
continue to work for economic growth, but this growth has to be sustainable so that future 
generations' income potential is not diminished. This further entails combating poverty both 
in the Norwegian society and abroad. Citing the fact that most of the emissions done so far 
has been contributed by industrial countries, the government holds the view there is a case to 
be made that more developed nations should make reductions first.  
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International solidarity 
Building on the prior point, both rich and poor nations have a combined but differentiated 
obligation to avoid climate change. This does not mean that poorer nations should not 
comply with the regulations, but it means that richer nations should help them comply. As 
nations emerge from poverty they are expected to take a greater share of the responsibility.   
The precautionary priciple 
The precautionary principle basically means that where there is scientific uncertainty, any 
doubt should be interpreted in favor of the environment. This further means that if there is a 
risk for serious or irreversible harm to the environment, lack of knowledge should not be 
used as an argument for delaying or suspending actions to mitigate this damage. 
The polluter pays 
Those who pollute should bear the real costs incurred by damage to humans and to the 
environment. Making the polluter pay should result in reduced environmental damage and 
better utilization of resources. A consistent implementation of this principle will result in the 
climate goals being reached at the lowest possible cost.  
This goes against the Coase theorem as discussed in the theory section however which states 
that if property rights are defined, given certain conditions then, regardless of how these 
property rights was initially distributed, liabilities or legal entitlements, the parties that are 
affected by an externality will bargain and negotiate between themselves and arrive at an 
efficient outcome (Norman & Orvedal, 2010). This goes to show that the government may 
be a bit one-sided in its approach to emissions reduction.  
The government is not consistent on this principle, if we interpret the application in a wider 
context. For instance in the case of cigarettes the consumer is the one who is taxed not the 
producer of the cigarettes (Sumner & Wohlgenant, 1985). This is of course due to the tax 
incidence in the case of cigarettes, which the government is perfectly aware of. In cases 
where supply is very inelastic, meaning that the same amount is likely to be produced 
regardless of cost to the supplier with corresponding stable emission levels there is a case to 
be made for the consumer being taxed, or rather, being made to pay.    
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Combined effort 
Sustainable development involves all segments of society, not only the authorities. Therefore 
the government must make it easy for its citizens to make the right choices.  
Sustainability - natures limit 
Here I refer to the discussion in the theory section. But, in short, this criterion means that any 
policy should aim to contribute to the 2°C increase target.   
Effective governance 
The principle of effective governance should dominate when a measure to do anything with 
an environmental issue is chosen. Effective governance means that the chosen approach 
should be the one that has the highest probability of reaching the desired goal. The issue of 
climate change is complex, as stated in the theory section; this breeds uncertainty and the 
measures taken need to reflect this complexity. Sources of such uncertainty may be that the 
reduction potential of any measure is difficult to quantify. This uncertainty may be related to 
whether the approach leads to the desired measures in the next step or on contextual factors 
such as population growth.  
A cap and trade system may for instance be deemed effective governance in the case of CO2 
due to the fact that we can say that with relative certainty the reduction goals will be reached, 
even if we do not know where the reductions will occur. With tradable quotas the system 
will also be cost effective. For an incredibly toxic substance such as arsenic on the other 
hand a quota system would not suffice. Here the effective governance approach may be to 
forbid the release of the substance. 
Cost effectiveness 
Cost effectiveness means that any measure taken should lead to the largest possible 
reduction at the lowest possible cost. If the government deviates from this principle, it will 
result in a loss of welfare.  
A cost effective climate policy is reached when all decision makers in society are faced with 
the same incentives to reduce their emissions. An equal price for the release of GHGs is an 
example of a cost effective measure. As stated in the theory section authorities have limited 
information about which measures will be the most effective, an equal price on emissions 
leaves the decision of where to reduce to the market.  
 49 
Cost effective fulfillment of a global stabilization goal, like the two degree goal (IPCC, 
2007) also requires that the incentives to reduce are the same regardless of regions and 
countries. Because the reduced emissions of GHGs have the same effect regardless of where 
it is done, climate policies should emphasize global cost effectiveness. 
Other 
In areas where general measures already apply, further regulation should be avoided. At the 
same time, the possibility of combining other measures in addition to quotas and fees must 
be upheld in these sectors. Especially in situations where measures may be cost effective 
over a projects lifetime when future, presumably rising, quota prices are in place.  
The government emphasizes that a good and active national climate policy also has to be a 
good industrial policy. The climate policy should therefore contribute to the development of 
more climate friendly industries. And the final and perhaps most important point when it 
comes to putting these principles into practice: "An ambitious climate policy also has to be 
reasonable in a global context. This entails paying heed to the consequences of the quota 
system, the danger of carbon leakage and the competiveness of Norwegian industries when 
policies are formed" (Ministry of Climate and Environment, 2012). 
4.2 Goals for the short sea sector 
The aims and goals for the Norwegian short sea sector is found in the "National transport 
plan 2014-2023" (NTP2013) published by the Department of Transport in 2013 (Ministry of 
Transport, 2013). In the most recent report the Department emphasizes that Norway has 
special circumstances relating to distances, settlements and wage levels that is bound to 
constitute somewhat higher costs than nations we compete with nations. These conditions set 
some parameters for Norwegian transport policy. At the same time the Department 
underscores the government's desire to create an efficient and environmentally friendly 
transport system, which can at the same time reduce transport costs, the competitive 
disadvantages and the environmental damage from transport.  
These are ambitions goals to be sure. The government has further subdivided its goals into 
an overarching goal of securing effectiveness in all sectors, road, rail, sea and air through 
continued development of infrastructure and better conduction of transport in general. The 
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other singled out sub-goal is to encourage a transition of the transport of goods from road to 
rail and sea.  
4.2.1 Transfer of goods from road to sea and rail 
According to NTP2013 the government intends for the majority of the projected increase in 
transport to be diverted to sea and rail rather than road.  
At the same time the government acknowledges that all modes of transport have their 
distinct advantages. Road transport is highly flexible, offering nationwide door-to-door 
service and with high security of delivery. Sea- and rail transport has a substantial cost 
advantage over longer distances, where higher volumes/weights are a factor and in cases 
where time is not the major service factor. In a Norwegian context, according to Ministry of 
Transport (2013) rail has the lowest costs per ton/km, followed by sea. This goes against 
many other sources, but Norway is a relatively small country and therefore quantities 
transported are not large. Most other sources hailing the environmental properties of sea 
transport use huge oil tankers and container vessels as benchmarks. Put simply, no 18,000 
TEU containerships are used in Norwegian domestic transport. Over substantially long 
distances and with large quantities and weights however, nothing beats ships. Sea transport 
also has a high security of delivery and maintenance costs are low. As stated sea-transport is 
an important part of the Norwegian transport system. It comprises 90 percent of transport 
work in foreign trade and 42 percent of domestic transport work. Sea transport has relatively 
low costs in infrastructure, area needed, congestion, noise, accidents and person damage, in 
addition to its relatively low emissions on a ton/km basis.  
One caveat with both sea and rail is that both are dependent on road transport at both ends. 
Therefore in many aspects the different modes of transport are complimentary to each other. 
Therefore if demand rises for rail or sea, the demand for road transport at the distribution 
points are also likely to increase. The only place where there is outright competition between 
them is therefore in long haul transport.  
According to the same report road transport over 500 km is a small part of total tons 
transported but comprises close to 40 percent of transport done on road. Thus there is a case 
to be made that even a small transfer of goods to either sea or rail could have a huge impact 
on emissions, bearing in mind that road transport is a major source of emissions in Norway 
and also that this is where emissions per ton/km is the highest. 
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Sea transport has its completive advantage where freight distance between terminals is over 
250 km. It already dominates tank and bulk, thus the greatest potential going forward is 
regular goods. The prognosis in NTP2013 states that transport of goods will increase by 40 
percent by 2030, where a relatively high portion will be covered by road, if current trends 
persist. Sea transport however has a lot going for it in terms of population growth in urban 
and concentrated areas, which may increase the quantity of goods that needs to be 
transported between the ports close to the larger cities, thereby catering to the advantages of 
sea transport in terms of higher volumes. Also the European commission in its white paper 
on European transport from 2011 aims to increase the amount of goods transported by ships 
(European Commission, 2011). This development by the EU puts pressure on the Norwegian 
government to prepare its ports for larger quantities of goods from the EU arriving by sea. 
The government intends to meet this demand by strengthening the short-sea infrastructure 
and further the competitiveness of short-sea shipping. In short their proposed measures in 
different sources are (Ministry of Fisheries and Coastal Affairs, 2013c; Ministry of trade and 
industry, 2013; Ministry of Transport, 2013): 
 Develop measures to stimulate increased use of short-sea shipping 
 Governmental subsidies to certain harbors 
 Governmental subsidies to harbor cooperation and concentration of goods 
 Support research on transport 
 Increase the competitiveness of short-sea shipping 
 Enable transitions between different transport forms 
 Combine terminals for rail and sea where this is possible 
 Invest in maritime infrastructure and ensure security in Norwegian waters.  
4.3 Goals for the fisheries sector 
According to the Ministry of Fisheries and Coastal Affairs (Ministry of Fisheries and Coastal 
affairs, 2013a, 2013b, 2013c, 2013d) the previous governments’ goals for the fisheries sector 
were (these have not been changed by the present government): 
The goals come in four major categories. First, the government has the ambition that the 
Norwegian fleet should be at the forefront in technology, security, quality and profitability. 
This includes the reduction of subsidies and overcapacity. Second, the fleet should be varied 
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along sizes and scope and contribute to value creation, activity and settlements in coastal 
areas. Third, a sustainable and knowledge based approach to the management of resources to 
ensure a high and long term dividend, while at the same time paying heed to environmental 
concerns. Fourth, ensure stable operating conditions to pave the way for continued 
development and through "good" fisheries management.   
The fundamental prerequisite for all of these goals is the wellbeing of the different fish 
stocks and productive ecosystems. This is the overarching goal of all the different fisheries 
authorities. Thus any year-by-year adjustments to policy are second to the adjustment of 
quotas which is set for one year only. According to Meld. St. 22 (2012-2013) over 90 
percent of the fish stocks relevant to Norwegian vessels are shared with other nations, 
therefore unilateral agreements are essential to the success of these policies.  
At the same time the government emphasizes that the fishing fleet has to generate profits to 
contribute to society. There are still problems with overcapacity in certain segments and too 
many people have fishing as a part time, rather than as a full time occupation. Here there is a 
goal conflict that is not really addressed in the government's plans. On the one hand the 
government wants to ensure profitability in the sector while at the same time it relies on the 
smaller vessels that in turn are dependent on local infrastructure and distribution to maintain 
settlements and opportunities for employment in coastal areas (understood as areas that are 
not larger cities). This conflict stems from the fact that with the current prices in the market 
and quota sizes being what they are, several smaller vessels (under 11 meters) are not 
profitable after capital expenses. Meld. St. 22 (2012-2013) refers to a study by Nofima 
conducted in 2013 which confirms this picture (Hermansen, Larsen, & Henriksen, 2013). 
The government should sort out its priorities here; vessels in this segment cannot compete in 
the long term without subsidies. Even the most active vessels in this category, who fulfil 
their quotas, cannot be said to be profitable over their lifespan (Hermansen et al., 2013). 
Implementation of new subsidies to this segment goes against the government's intention in 
its first goal 
In addition to these goals the government also has goals for the industry in terms of 
emissions outlined in the white paper on climate strategies for the Ministry of fisheries and 
coastal affairs (Ministry of Fisheries and Coastal Affairs, 2013b). Here the government plans 
to reduce any subsidies in the form of refunds, such as the refund of the mineral oil tax, to 
invest in research on new technologies and it has commissioned studies on further reduction 
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of overcapacity which includes the possibilities of subsidized scrapping. These policies are 
likely to further increase the economic strain that smaller vessels are facing (Hermansen et 
al., 2013; Isaksen & Hermansen, 2009). But, from an economic and environmental 
standpoint this approach may be reasonable.   
4.4 The Norwegian CO2 tax exemptions  
Even though Norway tries to adhere to the creed that it adapts its climate policy so that it 
"does its part in a good international climate policy" (NOU 2007:8, 2007), some sectors were 
initially exempt from paying these taxes. Norway has a long experience with environmental 
taxes and fees, and was an early mover when it introduced a CO2 fee on gasoline, diesel oil, 
mineral oil and petroleum extraction of petroleum in 1991 (NOU 2009:16, 2009). According 
to NOU 2009:16 (2009) the responsibility for taxes and fees lies with the Ministry of 
Finance. Changes to the system usually come in the form of a proposition to the parliament 
and a final decision is reached as a part of the budgetary negotiations for the following year. 
The legal foundation for the CO2-tax is found in "precept concerning special duties" 
(forskrift om særavgifter) number for-2001-12-11-1451 (2001). 
As stated the fisheries sector, the domestic short sea shipping and the domestic air traffic are 
some of the major contributors to the release of CO2. In spite of their noticeable 
contributions these sectors were exempt from paying or reimbursed for taxes on CO2. 
According to NOU2007:8 (2007) the reasoning behind the exemptions differed for each 
sector. The exemptions cited international competition for the shipping and air traffic, while 
the fisheries sector got their exemption from the initial "grunnavgift" or "base fee" in 1988 
on the grounds of low profitability in the industry. When the CO2-fee was introduced in 
1991 the "base fee" was discontinued and the reimbursement was given for the new fee 
instead. The situation for the fisheries sector is somewhat more complex than it is for the 
shipping and the air traffic, which were simply not required to pay the taxes. The fisheries 
sector on the other hand had a reimbursement scheme, but the economic effects of the 
different schemes are the same and thus they will not be outlined here in more detail.  
Ever since its inception the exemptions from the taxes have been debated. One notable 
incidence is in the government report NOU1996:3 (1996) on green taxes. Here the 
commission was divided in its recommendation of whether to continue the exemptions or 
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not. The majority suggested ending the exemptions and implementing a low tax on all the 
areas that was currently exempt.   
4.4.1 The tax today: 
As stated above the government's stance on the tax is evolving. In light of the recent targets 
for emissions reductions the authorities have therefore decided to remove the tax exemption 
for the fisheries and domestic/short sea shipping sector. This has so far been done in two 
tiers. First in 2013 and the most recent one effective from January 1st 2014 (Ministry of 
Finance, 2013b). The fees for 2014 are as presented in the table below (NOK/USD 
conversion 5,9NOK/1USD). 
 
Table 4: CO2-fees on petroleum and mineral oil products (Ministry of 
Finance, 2013b) 
As mentioned above the exemptions were done by giving a refund of the fee paid "at the 
pump". This mechanism is still in place, but the amount refunded has been reduced. For the 
fisheries sector the refund reduction is as follows: In 2013 the fleet paid NOK 0.61 at the 
pump and got a refund of NOK 0.48, resulting in a reduction of NOK 0.13/liter. In 2014 the 
CO2 tax 2014
NOK per 
l/Sm
3
/kg
NOK per 
ton CO2
USD per 
l/Sm
3
/kg
USD per 
ton CO2
Gasoline/petrol 0,92 397 0,16 67
Mineral Oil
– Light 0,88 330 0,15 56
– Heavy 0,88 281 0,15 48
– Mineral oil with road fees 0,62 233 0,11 39
– Mineral oil used in domestiv air travel (quota paying) 0,56 219 0,09 37
– Mineral oil used in domestiv air travel (other) 0,84 329 0,14 56
– Reduced fee light mineral oil 0,31 116 0,05 20
– Reduced fee heavy mineral oil 0,31 99 0,05 17
–  Reduced fee for fisheries in coastal/close waters 0,26 98 0,04 17
Domestic use of gas
– Natural gas 0,66 332 0,11 56
– LPG 0,99 330 0,17 56
– Reduced fee natural gas 0,05 25 0,01 4
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fleet paid NOK 0.88 at the pump and got a refund of NOK 0.62, resulting in a reduction of 
NOK 0.26/liter. Thus the effective tax for the fisheries sector is NOK 0.26/liter which 
represents a cost of NOK 98 or USD 17 per ton CO2 emitted. In other words, the sectors are 
still subsidized relative to full tax on the fuel they use.  
For the short-sea shipping sector, operating in Norwegian waters there is also a reduced 
refund in place. For 2014 the effective tax paid is NOK 0.31 or USD 0.05 for both light and 
heavy mineral oil. But due to different resulting emissions from burning these fuels the cost 
per ton CO2 emitted is USD 20 for light and USD 17 for heavy mineral oil. 
4.4.2 Reasons for current exemptions  
The legal reasoning behind the current exemptions could be topics for master thesis of their 
own; these will only be dealt with briefly here. Even though Norway strives to implement its 
climate policies in such a way that "We do our part in a good international climate policy", it 
can in certain cases be argued that this main principle does not apply for some sectors 
(Ministry of Finance, 2001, 2013b; NOU 2009:16, 2009). The arguments for such 
exemptions can be summed up in three groups.  
1. Following the principle will give another result than would be the case if all other 
nations followed the principle 
2. There should be no double taxation or double regulation of sectors that are already 
covered by the EU ETS or other systems. 
3. Additional regulations of emissions that are a part of the EU quota system (or any 
other system) will only shift emissions, within the bounds of the total level of 
emissions set, from Norwegian emitters to other emitters in the same system.    
With regards to the first group these arguments stem from the fact that the costs and prices 
and therefore competitive environment will be severely to the disadvantage of Norwegian 
organizations or production based in Norway if only Norway implemented schemes that 
follow the principle. This especially holds true for emissions intensive industries. This would 
constitute most of production for exports, which would in turn harm the Norwegian import-
export balance (Norman & Orvedal, 2010). 
There is no problem with implementing an enhanced taxation for sectors that are already 
under the regulation of other schemes such as the EU ETS if the price set by the relevant 
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scheme is deemed too low (in accordance with the government's estimate of optimal social 
cost of carbon). The reason why this generally is, in addition to the same reasons given 
above, that many believe that one should not undermine the EU ETS in any way. They cite 
the belief that, despite its shortcomings, it is a relatively good example of a unilateral deal to 
regulate emissions. 
The third group is really readily explained above. Additional regulations of emissions that 
are a part of any other system will only shift emissions from Norwegian emitters to other 
emitters in the same system. Additional regulations set exclusively for Norwegian companies 
will therefore not reduce total emissions; only relocate those emissions to some other 
jurisdiction. At the same time this will be a cost to Norway in terms of lost jobs, export 
income etc.  
4.5 The cost of running vessels 
To develop a general framework for the costs of running a vessel the frameworks given in 
Stopfords "Maritime Economics"(2009) will be used. This book is mainly concerned with 
shipping, but the basic theory holds for both classes.  
There is no generally accepted cost classification in the maritime industry. According to 
Stopford (2009) the costs can be divided into five categories: 
1. Operating costs – The cost of running the vessels daily operations, including crew, 
maintenance, stores, administration and. These costs will incur regardless of what 
kind of fisheries is being done. 
2. Periodic maintenance costs i.e. maintenance where normal operations are 
suspended like time spent in dry docks, engine overhauls and special surveys. 
3. Voyage costs are variable costs and examples are fuel costs and port charges. Also, 
emissions costs can vary for a vessel depending on where it operates and is as such 
a voyage cost. 
4. Capital costs depend on the financing of the ship, but staple items will be interest 
and debts. 
5. Cargo-handling costs. This is the cost related to the handling of cargo, such as 
loading, stowing and discharging. This is a point where fishing differs from 
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traditional shipping, but the discharging cost is still valid and a substantial part of 
costs.  
The introduction of a tax on CO2 emitted will not influence all these cost items however. The 
most relevant one is naturally the voyage costs (fuel and emissions fees), at least in the short 
run. In the long run also the capital costs (as the tax may incentivize investment in new 
technology, equipment or selling the vessel/buying a new one), operating costs (new 
equipment may require new skills, crew or affect maintenance) and periodic maintenance 
costs (adapting to new standards may require the vessel to go out of service for a time) can 
be affected. The only factor not really affected in the short or long run is the cargo-handling. 
As an example the cost structure of a 10-year old Capesize bulk carrier at 2005 prices is 
shown in the table below. As shown capital costs and voyage costs are the most important 
items by far. Furthermore, of the voyage costs 76 % is accounted for by the fuel costs (diesel 
and fuel oil combined). This goes to show that fuel costs are a defining factor of the vessels 
profitability.  
 
Table 5: Running costs of a Capesize carrier (Stopford, 2009) 
Of course this may only serve as an example with limited application to the fishing sector. 
Isaksen and Hermansen (2009) gives an outline of the cost structure for fishing vessels in 
their report which is maintained in their report on "factors that influence energy consumption 
in the Norwegian fishing fleet" (my translation) (Donnelly & Henriksen, 2012): 
1. Operating costs Manning costs 42 %
14 % Stores and lubricants 14 %
Repair and maintenance 16 %
Insurance 12 %
General costs 16 %
2. Periodic maintenence costs 4 % n.a.
3. Voyage costs 40 % Fuel oil 66 %
Diesel 10 %
Port costs 24 %
Canal dues n.a.
4. Cargo-handling costs n.a. ?
5. Capital costs 42 % Interest/dividend ?
Debt repayment ?
SUM 100 %
General cost classification Cost items
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Table 6:Running cost for fishing vessels (Isaksen & Hermansen, 2009) 
We see that fuel is a relatively lower share of total costs for fishing vessels even though it is 
smaller and varies more in its speed like fishing vessels can be said to do. It is worth 
mentioning that, fishing vessels in operation have equipment deployed which may cause 
significant drag, which in turn increases fuel costs. There are significant differences in the 
kind of equipment used when it comes to size and therefore manpower needed, therefore the 
cost structures are divided into pelagic and demersal indicating what kind of fishery is in 
question.    
In addition, as the vessels or ships get older, fuel costs as a share of total costs is likely to 
increase as capital expenditures go down while the engine gets less efficient, the hull 
generates more friction and the propeller and its shaft gets worn due to cavitations and rust. 
Thus, as fuel costs are likely to increase over time for older ships the effect of the tax 
increase will also be felt relatively more for these vessels  
One item that may seem missing from this picture is taxes. The reason for this is that 
Stopford (2009) deals with shipping which, as an international industry, is notoriously 
difficult to regulate and tax. Any ship can sail under a flag of convenience and therefore 
most shipping nations have very beneficial taxation for shipping companies to keep their 
businesses. This also holds for some of the fishing fleet, especially the large "factory 
trawlers". For the smaller vessels that operate within the economic zone of one country 
however there may be significant taxes that they will not be able to avoid. In the case of the 
fishing vessel examples the taxes are incorporated in the cost items given (Isaksen & 
Hermansen, 2009). 
Cost Item Pelagic Demersal
Wages 36 44
Maintenance 16 15
Fuel 15 14
Other 12 13
Depreciation 14 7
Cost structure for fishing vessels
Segment
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4.6 The price of oil 
According to Stopford (2009) the oil price, and thus the price of fuel will have a great impact 
on operational costs. As we can see from figure 12 below the oil price, while fluctuating a lot 
as increased substantially from 2005 until today. The years from 2007 to 2011 shows huge 
fluctuations mainly due to the financial crisis. After 2011 the prices seem to have stabilized 
somewhat, Markets (2014) in their market outlook for 2014 even projects a downward trend 
down to 96 USD/brl in 2017. 
 
Figure 11: Brent price development 10yrs, last date 05.12.2014 (NASDAQ, 
2014) 
As with all commodities the future oil price is determined by the outlook of the supply and 
demand. The primary demand drivers are according to DNB Markets that the global 
dependence on oil is not set to decrease in the foreseeable future. China and other rapidly 
growing countries are increasing their demand faster than the western world reduces its 
dependence. The rapid growth of the BRICS countries (Brazil, Russia, India, China and 
South Africa) has lifted millions of people out of poverty and these new participants in the 
world economy can now afford to consume more oil. These emerging markets now consume 
over 50% of oil globally, and they are still increasing. This leads both DNB Markets and the 
International Energy Agency (2013) to the view that demand will be strong in the years to 
come, and that this will keep prices high compared to historical levels even though there is a 
slight downward trend.  
On the supply-side we find the major driver of potential shocks, such as the "Arab spring". 
The continuing instability in the Arab region is a major source of uncertainty in the forecasts 
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of both DNB and the IEA. Traditionally such instability have caused major risk premiums in 
the oil price, and these have in turn been the drivers of large fluctuations depending on the 
shifting of threat assessments. The advent of unconventional oil sources in the US may 
however moderate these fluctuations. These new sources may also shift the import-export 
relationships we see in the world today, for instance making the US self-sufficient by 2035. 
This increase of supply may be enough to satisfy the increasing demand from emerging 
markets. The price is unlikely to decrease by much however because the price of developing 
these new unconventional sources are relatively high. In sum both DNB Markets and IEA 
projects an oil price of around the 100USD/brl mark for at least 5-10 years (International 
Energy Agency, 2013; Markets, 2014). RS Platou holds the view that the oil price will 
probably exceed these estimates, citing geopolitical risks (RS Platou ASA, 2014). 
4.7 The price of fuel 
Today most vessels operating in Norwegian and European waters that are designated as 
ECAs use various blends of low sulfur IFO. The most common of these are IFO180 and 
IFO380. In addition some vessels use MDO and MGO. These two latter ones are distillates 
and are considered the best option from an environmental point of view, due to the fact that 
burning these types of fuel produces less undesirable bi-products. The price differentials for 
the last year are shown below. Figure 13 shows regular blends and figure 14 shows low 
sulfur options respectively. MGO is more expensive than the IFO options, as shown by the 
graphs below.  
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Figure 12: Regular IFO380, IFO180 and MGO delivered in Rotterdam 
The regular blends have seen a downward trend over the last year, while the demand for  
MGO is increasing and this results in a slight upward trend (RS Platou ASA, 2014).  
 
Figure 13: Low sulfur IFO380, IFO180 and MGO delivered in Rotterdam 
The demand for low sulfur options is increasing relative to the demand for regular 
alternatives. This is the main driver for the increased price over the last year. This is driven 
by the impending enhanced SECA regulations. These new regulations state that the level of 
sulfur allowed in shipping fuel will decrease from 1% to 0.1% from 2015. As stated above 
this is a step in the general effort to reduce the amount of pollution generated by the shipping 
industry. In order to comply, operators will have to switch to a low sulfur fuel.  
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The combined enhanced SECA-, ECA-, CO2-, NOX- and other MARPOL annex VI 
regulations is likely to drive the trend towards low sulfur fuels in the short and medium term. 
In the long term alternatives such as LNG and scrubbers may become more viable, both in 
technology terms (for both LNG and scrubbers) and in availability terms for LNG fuel.   
4.8 Increased fuel prices due to tax increase 
The Mineral Oil tax is determined based on the emission of CO2. With the current scheme 
the tax is as follows. Some other estimates of the social cost of carbon are included to 
emphasise that the Norwegian level must be considered low compared to optimal levels. 
 
Table 7: Fee per ton CO2 released 
To determine how this will affect operating costs for a fishing vessel or a ship these fees 
must be converted to fee per ton bunkers. The specific weights used are MGO 0,845 
g/cm3gir which gives 1 183 liters/ton and IFO380 with specific weight of 0,950 g/cm 3 
which gives 1 053 liters/ton. The fee per ton fuel is therefore: 
 
Table 8: Fee per ton bunkers (converted) 
The fee for the fisheries sector does not differentiate between fuel types. There are a variety 
of blends that could be discussed, for simplicity these are ignored however.  
Bunker prices vary a lot, both over time and between delivery sights. Both the absolute price 
and relative prices between MGO and IFO380 will vary over time. The only readily 
available price data in bunkers is from Rotterdam, which is used throughout this thesis.  
Current Fee Nordhaus (2010) US Gov (2013) Arrow et.al (2014)
MGO light 20 35,3 43,5 50,6
MGO Heavy 17 30 37 43
Fisheries 17 30 37 43
Fee per ton CO2 (USD)
Current Fee Nordhaus (2010) US Gov (2013) Arrow et.al (2014)
MGO light 62,60 110,47 136,25 158,34
MGO Heavy 54,23 95,70 118,03 137,17
Fisheries 54,23 95,70 118,03 137,17
Fee per ton Bunkers (USD)
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4.9 The impact on vessel/ship costs 
Now that we have established a base for determining the cost of fuel and the corresponding 
CO2 tax levied, we can determine the impact on the running costs of fishing vessels and 
ships.  
4.9.1 Impact on short-sea costs 
In the following I will concentrate on the smaller ships as they are most likely to mainly 
operate in Norwegian waters. Larger ships will have a greater opportunity to travel outside 
Norway or indeed outside Europe. With regards to ship types, fuel consumption and capacity 
this section draws its numbers from Olsen (2000) which in turn got his numbers from Wilson 
Ship Management. These numbers may seem relatively old, but according to the report "Stø 
Kurs 2020" many ships operating in Norwegian waters are relatively old (Ministry of trade 
and industry, 2013). The selected ships are dry-bulk ships. There are three sizes; 1500 DWT; 
3500 DWT and 6000 DWT. An important distinction is that the largest ship uses IFO380 
whereas the other two use MGO.    
For simplification the cost per ton cargo is calculated with the assumption of 100% 
utilization. Capacity utilization grade will not affect the percentage cost increase. Costs per 
ton cargo for one trip is given by (Stopford, 2009): 
        
  
 
Where cost of bunkers Cb, harbor Ch and fixed daily costs Cf is divided by the cargo capacity 
CC. Bunker costs are dependent on time at sea, specific bunker use at different speeds and 
fees. Harbor costs vary by number of port calls. Fixed costs are by their nature fixed. Fuel 
used for other purposes such as start engines are ignored. The capacities, calculation speed 
and corresponding fuel consumption for the three different ships are: 
 
Table 9: Capacities, speed and corresponding fuel consumption  
Ship Capasity Speed Fuel consumption Type
Ship 1 1850 9 3,5 ton/day LFO
Ship 2 3500 11,5 4,7 ton/day LFO
Ship 3 1859 12,5 11 ton/day HFO
 64 
This gives us the following cost increases per ton cargo: 
 
Table 10: Price increase per ton cargo 
As we can see from table 10; the cost per ton cargo increases by 2.19 percent for the two 
smaller vessels and by 2.75 percent for the larger one. With shorter distances time in port 
will be more significant and the increased fee has less effect. Over longer distances bunker 
costs become a more significant factor and the effect of the increased fee will rise 
correspondingly. Olsen (2000) gives a range from 3 percent increase up to 15 percent 
depending on distance, albeit at a higher fee of USD 34 per ton CO2 emitted, compared to 
the fee of USD 17 and 20 used here. 
An increase of 2.19-2.75 percent may not seem like a huge increase, but this must be 
considered a lowest possible value. Also in a highly competitive market such as transport 
this may be enough to shift competition in favor of e.g. road transport, which has a 
substantially larger environmental footprint by any measure (Ministry of Transport, 2013).  
The cost increase is largest for the heaviest ship due to this ship having relatively low bunker 
costs as it uses IFO380, and thus the fee represents a higher percentage increase in costs.  
According to Olsen (2000) and the discussion of competition in the national transport plan of 
(2010-2019) which is mentioned as unchanged in the current NTP2013 (Ministry of 
Transport, 2009, 2013) there is little competition between sizes of ships. For the smaller ones 
the value of the cargo is relatively high and cargo size small. They may combine different 
cargos and frequency and high numbers of port calls are important. The differences in 
transport costs, and thus freight rates, between ship sizes are high and therefore an increased 
tax is not likely to shift competition between the sizes. 
Prior fee Present fee Prior fee Present fee Prior fee Present fee
0 20 0 20 0 17
1,73 1,76 1,23 1,25 3,65 3,75
Increase 2,19 % Increase 2,19 % Increase 2,75 %
1850 ton 3500 ton 5850 ton
Increase in fuel cost per ton cargo due to CO2 fee by ship capacity
3,5 ton/day MGO 4,7 ton/day MGO 11 ton/day IFO180
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4.9.2 Impact on fishing vessel operation costs 
According to the national budget (Ministry of Finance, 2013a) and the government white 
paper on taxes in 2014 published in 2013 (Ministry of Finance, 2013b) there is no 
differentiation in the CO2 tax for fuel types in the fisheries industry. Regardless most vessels 
use types of MGO. Here the costs are based differentiated by vessel length. According to 
Isaksen and Hermansen (2009) in their report prior to the reduction of the refund to the 
fisheries sector one can divide the vessels into 6 groups based on cost characteristics. The 
table below shows the number of vessels in each group and the total fuel used by this group 
in 2007. The consumption of fuel is based on the amount that was reported to receive the 
refund. This must therefore be considered representative for actual consumption. This 
number is further divided by number of vessels to get annual consumption per vessel in each 
group and converted to tons.      
 
Table 11: Annual consumption per vessel 
Once this has been done we can easily calculate the increased costs represented by the new 
fee. This is done in the table below: 
 
Table 12: Cost increase 
Note that here there has already been an increase done in 2013, the new fee thus represents 
only the increase from 2013 to 2014. Total increase over the last two years is 1.8 percent. 
Seeing that, as in the short-sea sector, the cost of fuel is a substantial part of operational costs 
for fishing vessels an increase of 1.8 percent over two years is substantial. And as stated 
before, this is only the effect of the mineral oil tax. Over the last years both sectors have 
Vessel length group Number of vessels (2007) Total 1000 l Fuel consumption per vessel Converted to tons 
Under 8 m 312 557 1785 2
8-9,9 m 1233 3994 3239 4
10-14,9 m 1740 20295 11664 14
15-20,9 m 256 9617 37566 44
21-27,9 m 226 35888 158796 188
Over 28 m 242 173555 717169 849
Vessel length group Consumption pr vessel/tons Fuel price Old fee (8 USD/ton CO2) New fee (17 USD/ton CO2) Increase
Under 8 m 2 913 1842 1858 0,9 %
8-9,9 m 3 913 2762 2787 0,9 %
10-14,9 m 14 913 12891 13008 0,9 %
15-20,9 m 44 913 40515 40881 0,9 %
21-27,9 m 188 913 173111 174673 0,9 %
Over 28 m 849 913 781764 788815 0,9 %
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been subject to enhanced taxation and fees on both sulfur and NOX emissions. Combined 
these enhanced regulations therefore is likely to affect the market substantially.  
Who bears the cost of these enhanced regulations is not certain however, until we have 
explored the tax incidence of these new regulations. Only then can we determine whether the 
vessel and ship owners manage to shift the cost to their customers or if they have to shoulder 
the increase themselves. This brings us to the next section. 
4.10 Who will pay the tax, consumers or the industry 
As stated in the theory section we need the price elasticity of both supply and demand to 
determine how the burden of the mineral oil tax will be divided between the actors in the 
market. We will look at the incidence from the perspective of the suppliers i.e. the ship or 
vessel owners. When viewed from this perspective the pass-through rate, the share of any tax 
increase that has falls on the supplier is as follows: 
 
Table 13: Suppliers share of tax increase 
With a perfectly inelastic demand the supplier will be able to pass on the entire tax burden to 
its customers. We also see that where the elasticities are equal the burden will be shared 
evenly. Where the demand elasticities are between -0.5 and -2, and where the supply 
elasticity at the same time is inelastic the supplier will have to shoulder most of the burden 
of any tax increase. 
These elasticities are also interesting from an environmental and emissions reduction point 
of view. If either supply or demand (or indeed both) are relatively inelastic the transport or 
fishing effort is not likely to decrease regardless of the price increase. If this is the case the 
tax will only be an extra source of income for the government, but have no effect on the 
environment as the effort put in will not be reduced and therefore emissions also will not be 
Perfectly inelastic Inelastic Unity inelastic Elastic
0 -0,5 -1 2
Perfectly inelastic 0 0 -100 % -100 % -100 %
Inelastic 0,5 0 -50 % -67 % -80 %
Unity inelastic 1 0 -33 % -50 % -67 %
Elastic 2 0 -20 % -33 % -50 %
Suppliers share of a tax with different elasticities
Demand Curve
Supply curve
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reduced. This goes back to the "Double dividend"-discussion in the theory section. If 
demand or supply is inelastic there will be no double dividend.  
In the following two segments we will look at the short-sea and fisheries sector separately.  
4.10.1 Tax incidence in the short-sea sector 
Unfortunately, and somewhat surprisingly, there is little research on the elasticities of both 
elasticities of supply and for demand in the shipping sector as a whole, and for the short-sea 
sector specifically. Therefore the determination of tax incidence and pass-through rate must 
necessarily be quite anecdotal. But a better understanding of how supply and demand 
interacts in the shipping market through the freight rate mechanism will give us a good 
approximation. 
According to Stopford (2009) the freight rate at any given time reflects the balance of ships 
(supply) and cargoes (demand) available in the market. The freight rate is determined after 
negotiations between ship-owners and charterers. When the supply of ships is high, freight 
rates are low, and vice versa. The supply-side can be illustrated as follows:  
 
Figure 14: a) Supply increases as the ship speeds up. b) As the rate 
increases more ships enter the market 
As we can see from the graphs, when prices (freight rates) are above break even for a ship it 
will enter service. When it has entered service its supply is relatively inelastic. If prices are 
below breakeven the ship is likely to be laid up. 
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On the demand side the elasticity depends on the alternatives available to owner of the goods 
to be shipped. The graph below illustrates a case where there are few substitutes, such as 
intercontinental shipping by VLCCs.  
 
Figure 15: a) Demand curve, b) Market Equilibrium 
Here, as we can see the charterer is dependent on shipping the relevant cargo, and thus the 
demand is relatively inelastic. The figure to the right (d) shows equilibrium where the market 
is cleared at about 170 USD per million ton miles.  
As we can see in these cases both demand and supply is relatively inelastic. But, these 
examples are drawn from Stopford (2009) and his examples are mainly relevant for 
international shipping, where there are few substitutes and the only real option to making a 
deal is to either layup the ship on the supply side when faced with low freight rates or in the 
opposite case to not ship the relevant goods in the case where the freight cost would erode 
your profits entirely.   
In short-sea however the substitutes are in the very least road transport or rail, for instance 
shown by Evensen (2000) and Hovi and Grønland (2011). Thus the inelastic demand shown 
in the most recent graph above is not likely to apply. At least not for heterogeneous cargo 
(not bulk or tank), and cargo where timing is of the essence. In these cases it may be argued 
that the pass-through rate will be found in the region indicated by the blue square in the table 
below.  
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Table 14: Indicated area of pass-through rates 
This implies that the majority of the tax increase will fall to the owners of the ships, rather 
than to the customers. 
4.10.2 Tax incidence in the Fisheries sector 
Fortunately there is more research done on the elasticities in the fisheries sector, at least 
when it comes to the demand side. This is mainly due to the end product being a consumer 
good. Most of these studies are in turn done on salmon, but for simplicity we will not 
differentiate between different species of fish here.    
With regards to the demand elasticity there are quite a few studies that have been done. As 
the Norwegian fleet supplies both the domestic and international market it is interesting to 
look at elasticities for both consumer segments. Indeed due to the size of the catch the 
domestic market would not be able to soak up a substantial fall in demand in other markets. 
In addition such a comparison is interesting in light of the fishing industry being one of 
Norway's major export industries.  
Seale, Regmi, and Bernstein (2003) and Muhammad, Seale Jr, Meade, and Regmi (2011) 
have estimated price elasticity’s for different foods in more than 114 nations as a part of the 
international comparison project, among them Norway. For the product group "fish" the 
average price elasticity was estimated to be -0.35 in the EU and -0.31 in Norway, meaning 
that if the price of fish increases with 1 percent demand will decrease by 0.3 percent.  
Bendiksen (2008) lists several demand elasticities for fish in his report. The majority of 
sources he cites use elasticities in the region of -1 to -2 based on product categories and 
species. Among them are Kinnucan and Myrland (2002) who estimate a price elasticity to be 
-1.93 in the EU and -1.08 in Norway for Norwegian salmon. Fousekis and Revell (2004) 
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estimate in their study a range from -0.45 to -1.65 depending on product in British retail 
stores. There are however differences in the elasticities depending on type of catch, with the 
industrial catches such as capelin which is used in the production of fish meal having a 
relatively inelastic demand whereas more luxury goods such as lobster and fresh cod having 
a relatively elastic demand. 
 Turning to the supply side, the story may be quite different. Here unfortunately, as was the 
case with research on the supply side in short-sea shipping, there is little research. Bendiksen 
(2008) however has an interesting perspective on the issue of supply elasticities in the 
fisheries sector. Following his reasoning we would denote the supply as perfectly inelastic, 
due to the quota regulations in the major fisheries in Norwegian waters. Because fish is a 
limited resource the government regulates how much the stock can be taxed in any given 
year. This is done either by quotas that are limited or by limiting the time period when a 
certain catch is allowed. It follows that, due to the mentioned regulations, even if prices 
increase due to demand the industry is not allowed to catch more to capitalize on the 
situation. This is illustrated as follows: 
 
Figure 16: kinked supply curve due to quotas 
Here the supply-curve has no effect above the level of the quota set by the government M. 
For quantities demanded over M the demand is perfectly inelastic. Bendiksen (2008) 
cautions however that there are fisheries where the full quotas are not fully utilized, or where 
there are redistributions in the fleet that secures full utilization.  
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For the major fisheries this analogy holds however. In fact it can be assumed that the price 
elasticity on wild caught fish is low and in many cases almost perfectly inelastic. For 
instance if the price of cod drops by 25 percent, the full quota will still be used, as indeed 
happened in the period from 2001 to 2003 (Bendiksen, 2008).  
Thus the inelastic supply shown in the most recent graph above is likely to apply, whereas 
the demand is shown to be relatively elastic. As with the case of short-sea shipping it may be 
argued that in the case of fisheries the pass-through rate will be found in the region indicated 
by the blue square in the table below.  
 
Table 15: Indicated area of pass-through rates 
This implies that the majority of the tax increase will fall to the owners of the ships, rather 
than to the customers, even for the luxury catches.  
4.10.3 Summary of tax incidence 
In short, elasticities of supply for both the fisheries sector the short-sea sector are relatively 
inelastic and the elasticity of demand relatively elastic. In other words we see that both 
sectors fall within the section of our table where the demand elasticities are between -0.5 and 
-2, and where the supply elasticity at the same time is inelastic. Hence for both our sectors 
the supplier will have to shoulder most of the burden of any tax increase. 
4.11 Can the taxes be avoided?  
Now that we have determined that the supply side is likely to have to bear the majority of the 
tax increase it is interesting to explore whether there are opportunities to avoid or circumvent 
the tax. One such opportunity is fueling in other jurisdictions, and is relevant to both the 
fisheries and short-sea sector.  
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There is the danger of giving segments of the industries advantages as some have the 
opportunity to purchase fuel in other jurisdictions, thus avoiding the tax all-together, some 
have the opportunity to do it to some extent, while some do not have the option what so ever. 
This advantage in addition follows size, where larger ships and vessels may have greater 
access to these remedies than smaller ones. For instance some short-sea ships travel 
internationally and some do not. In the shipping sector one may give an implicit advantage 
(or indeed increase the current advantage) to ships that travel internationally over those who 
mainly operate between Norwegian ports. It may also give an advantage to foreign operators.  
In economic terms one can assume that the vessels that have the opportunity to do this will 
do it if, and only if, the savings associated with fueling in another jurisdiction is higher than 
the cost of making the journey (all factors considered).  
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5. Discussion 
Based on the analysis and information above we can now answer the questions asked in the 
introduction. To remind ourselves, these are;  
1. How will the reduction of the mineral oil tax reimbursement scheme affect the 
Norwegian short-sea shipping and fisheries sectors? 
2. Will the reduction help the government in reaching its "climate goals" and sector 
specific goals?  
3. Are there potential for "double dividends" in terms of tax revenue, goal 
achievement and reduced emissions? 
4. Could anything be done differently? 
5. Based on the findings; what are the recommended course of action/polices going 
forward? 
Naturally these questions are somewhat overlapping, but in the following I will try to 
separate them. I remind the reader that this thesis see these issues from the regulators 
standpoint. The first thee questions will be discussed here, while question four will be treated 
in the next chapter. 
5.1 The effect on the sectors 
The analysis in section 4 suggests that increasing the tax on mineral oil through reducing the 
tax refund is likely to affect the industries substantially. Costs are expected to rise by at least 
2.2 % for the short-sea shipping sector and at least 1 % for the fisheries sector. The increase 
is further expected to be shouldered almost entirely by the operators based in the tax 
incidence determined by the elasticities of supply and demand. Profits and returns are 
therefore likely to suffer.  
For the fisheries sector total input is not likely to be reduced due to the desirability of the 
quotas and the "kinked" nature of supply, described in figure 18, resulting in perfectly 
inelastic supply. Some vessels may be scrapped if profitability is too low, reducing 
overcapacity. If some vessels exit the market their quotas would be distributed between the 
incumbents or new entries. This would either increase the utilization of the incumbent 
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vessels or perhaps induce investment in newer more efficient and environmentally friendly 
vessels. There is likely to be a combination of these effects.  
The short-sea sector may see some reduced input due to higher breakeven freight rates for 
some ships. Ships that are no longer profitable will be laid up or moved to other 
jurisdictions. Seeing that the demand for transport is not likely to decline the reduced supply 
of transport services from ships is likely to filled by other modes of transport such as rail and 
road. Bulk is believed to be more persistent than goods in this regard as road transport is not 
considered an appropriate substitute. Rail may become more competitive, but has limitations 
with regards to availability. 
The tax increase is expected to affect smaller actors more severely than larger ones in both 
sectors due to the latters’ opportunities to avoid paying the tax by refueling in other 
jurisdictions and by having more sophisticated business models.  
Because this thesis wants to evaluate this from the viewpoint of the regulator the question of 
whether these effects are to be considered beneficial or not must be determined in light of the 
governments’ goals for the sectors and its climate goals.  
5.2 Goal fullfillment 
5.2.1 Climate goals 
With regards to the governments’ principles for measures to reduce emissions the measure of 
reducing the refund seems like an easy measure to implement and may in the long term have 
some positive effects with regards to investment in new technology in both sectors and 
reduced overcapacity in the fisheries sector. Here the principles will be discussed one by 
one. 
Fair distribution and international solidarity 
In terms of fair distribution between generations, the reduction is a step in the right direction. 
There is however a long way to go according to the estimates of the social costs of carbon 
that are projected and shown section 4.4.1, the current effective emissions tax falls way short 
of most of these estimates. Indeed taken at face value, as the scheme is still a net refund it 
can still be interpreted as a subsidy to the sectors compared to other sectors of the Norwegian 
economy that face the full cost of emissions. Viewed as a net subsidy one can even argue 
 75 
that the current scheme is directly opposed to the interests of future generations as subsidies 
generally lead to intensified input and thus to increased emissions. 
Viewed in light of Brander and Spencer (1985) the current scheme may even be seen as an 
export subsidy for the Norwegian fisheries industry. The article by Brander and Spencer 
shows that export subsidies, in whatever form, can be seen as attractive policy tools because 
they can be used to improve the relative position of a domestic firm in competition with 
foreign firms. As the World Trade Organization (WTO) is intensifying its focus on reducing 
export subsidies, this may increase pressure to eliminate the refund in the years to come.  
Since the subsidy now is being reduced the effort must be seen as a step in the right direction 
when it comes to equitable distribution between rich and poor countries and thus 
international solidarity as artificial advantages of the Norwegian fisheries sector is reduced. 
It is important to note that although there is still a net subsidy; the reduction of the refund 
will be seen as a tax increase by the sectors.   
The precautionary priciple and sustainability - natures limit 
Unfortunately, the measure must be said not to be in line with the precautionary principle. 
While points are given for the effort, we must yet again remind ourselves that the current tax 
still falls way short of most estimates of the social cost of carbon. The potential devastating 
effects of climate change has been known for several years, the reduction of the refund was 
only implemented two years ago. 
The polluter pays 
As we have seen in the discussion about the tax incidence the principle that the polluter pays 
must be said to be fulfilled. As the discussion in analysis section 4.9.1 and 4.9.2 showed; the 
suppliers are likely to bear the majority of the cost increase due to relatively elastic demand 
compared to the elasticity of demand. This is however somewhat mitigated by the potential 
to avoid the tax for some segments of the industry, mainly the larger entities that have the 
opportunity to refuel in different jurisdictions. At least the polluter now pays more than 
before. 
Combined effort 
This principle states that sustainable development involves all segments of society, not only 
the authorities. Therefore the government should make it easy for its citizens to make the 
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right choices. In light of this, as stated before, the measure may incentivise investment in 
new technologies, equipment and vessels/ships that are more environmentally friendly. But 
using a "sticks and carrots"-metaphor, this measure would perhaps be seen as a "stick" from 
the sectors point of view rather than a "carrot". One may take issue with the introduction of a 
tax being something that makes it "easier" to make the "right" choices. To constitute a 
combined effort the introduction of the tax must be combined with other measures on behalf 
of the government to induce change in the sectors, such as; investment in research and 
infrastructure. 
Effective governance 
Whether it can be considered effective governance is a complex issue. The measure certainly 
targets the right variable, and in the case of fisheries may be said to be effective in that it has 
the potential to reduce overcapacity. For the short-sea sector the picture may be different 
however depending on how it affects the relative competitive strength of short-sea shipping 
compared to road transport. If this new regulation is not matched by enhanced regulation for 
road transport the benefits may be few. NTP2013 states that the costs for road transport are 
decreasing due to foreign labor and operators, thus this industry is capturing market share. If 
however the reduction of the refund is compensated by substantially lowering harbor fees, 
other taxes not directly related to the environment and investing in infrastructure, the 
increased fuel tax may incentivize the operators to invest in new ships and technology while 
at the same time not giving road transport a relative advantage. This dual approach seems to 
be lacking though, and there seems to be a conflict between the goals for increased transport 
by sea (and the following environmental advantages) and the implementation of this tax. 
Cost effectiveness 
The measure cannot be considered cost effective as the collection of the tax at one end, and a 
refund at the other to the same entity must result in an efficiency loss. Also, all sectors do not 
face the same cost, and thus the market cannot decide where the reductions can be done in 
the cheapest way. There is also a problem with regards to the measure being likely to affect 
the smaller actors more severely than the larger ones (due to the larger ones opportunity to 
dodge the tax), which goes against the governments stated goals for both settlements in rural 
areas and its emphasis in small businesses. But from a solely economic perspective the 
ambition to maintain settlements may not be desirable; in that case a shift to larger and more 
efficient vessels may be cost effective. This last point hinges on the economic viability of the 
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governments settlement policies and a discussion of this policy's merits is beyond the scope 
of this thesis.  
Other 
When it comes to the "other" factor much of the apparent contradictions may well be 
explained as this principle more or less serves as an escape clause if the prior principles ask 
too much in too short a time. The principle states that an ambitious climate policy also has to 
be reasonable in a global context. This entails paying heed to the consequences of the quota 
system, the danger of carbon leakage and the competiveness of Norwegian industries when 
policies are formed. In the sectors discussed here this most certainly applies. Both sectors are 
important for exports as well as employment and could easily be replaced by foreign 
operators and labour.  
I would describe the current situation as a "Prisoners Dilemma" where the individual nations 
actions are relative to the actions of the competitors. If a one nation implements enhanced 
regulations in the current economic climate its companies are likely to have to raise their 
prices and would therefore loose to its competitors resulting in lost jobs etc. for the nation 
that regulates. Its dominant strategy is therefore not to regulate, as it is the best course of 
action for the individual nation given what the competitors are doing under the current 
regulatory regime (or indeed: game setup).  
In light of this last point it is therefore completely understandable that Norway does not 
make its domestic companies face the full cost of the externalities they create when their 
competition do not have to face these costs. Here the Norwegian government has to work to 
change the rules of the game rather than just playing it differently. This will be discussed 
further in the next chapter however. 
5.2.2 Goals for the short-sea sector and "double dividends" 
With regards to the "double dividend" potential, in the case of the short-sea sector it seems to 
be especially detrimental. First, due to the inelasticity of supply in this sector, where if the 
ship is marginally profitable it will maximize its utilization, and if it is not profitable it will 
be laid up there is not much emissions reduction potential for a ship in operation. The only 
likely effect is that the breakeven freight rate for ships is likely to increase, resulting in ships 
being laid up faster.  
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This may push some of the older and more polluting ships out of the market, and incentivize 
ship-owners to invest in more environmentally friendly designs in the future which would be 
a positive outcome.  
However, the tax increase for the short sea sector is not matched by a corresponding tax 
increase for road transport and demand for transport is not likely to decrease. Thus cargo is 
likely to shift to road-transport where road transport is competitive, such as in some 
segments of container transport (Hovi & Grønland, 2011; Riksrevisjonen, 2014). As road 
transport generates more emissions per ton/kilometre the net effect of the tax increase may 
be increased emissions in total. This result also goes against the governments stated goals for 
more goods transported at sea. In terms of emissions reductions there are therefore limited 
possibilities for a positive outcome. 
The tax increase will generate revenue for the government, which may in itself be regarded 
as positive from the governments standpoint. If the tax is used to fund some of the goals for 
the sector such as reduced harbour fees, investment in infrastructure and research in new 
technology the tax may even be considered a net positive from an industry standpoint, 
provided that the government also matches this contribution or even invests a larger amount. 
Then the measure could truly be called a combined effort. 
Although this last point shows potential unfortunately a very recent report (published May 
22nd 2014) by Riksrevisjonen, evaluating the governments work on increasing the share of 
goods transported by sea points to this not being the case (Riksrevisjonen, 2014). The 
government has set lofty goals, but done very little to fulfil them. It seems that the revenue 
from the tax has been used on other causes. Main findings in the report are that "1. There is 
weak governance related to the goal of transferring goods from road to sea. 2. Investment in 
important infrastructure can be improved and 3. The tax system aids the goal to a very small 
degree" (p.10). Thus the report largely supports the findings of this study. It should be noted 
that the report must be seen as an evaluation of the previous governments’ efforts. One may 
hope that the new one will make a better effort.  
In other words there are no "double dividends" likely to materialize in this case and the 
measure in total seems to work against the governments goals for the industry. Because the 
tax may even shift demand for transport from sea to road the measure may even indirectly 
increase emissions.   
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5.2.3 Goals for the fisheries sector and "double dividends" 
With regards to the double dividend potential in the case of fisheries one might even be as 
bold as to hope for a potential "triple dividend" in the sense that the tax could generate 
increased income for the government, emission reductions and a reduction in the 
overcapacity in the industry.  
Alas, this ideal case may not materialize mainly because of to the inelasticity of supply due 
to the quota scheme. As discussed earlier the quotas have been fulfilled even when prices 
have dropped substantially, indicating that fishing efforts are at normal levels even under 
such conditions. Thus, "normal" emissions levels are likely to persist even after the 
implementation of the tax.  
There may be some potential for scrapping of older vessels and thus a reduction of 
overcapacity; this will however not result in less quantity caught. However, since 
overexploitation is not a major problem in most of the fisheries relevant to Norwegian 
vessels, the fact that the total catch is likely be the same may not be a problem.  
Reduced overcapacity may improve the profitability of the sector as the remaining vessels 
may be more fully utilized which are in line with the governments goals for the sector. This 
would alleviate the rent dissipation experienced in the sector.  
The government will take in more tax-revenue. But even here the net economic benefit may 
be negative. Larger vessels may have more opportunities to avoid paying the tax as they can 
travel longer distances (i.e. to other jurisdictions) and refuel there, provided that the cost of 
making the journey is less than paying the higher price in Norway. Larger corporations are 
also likely to be more sophisticated in their business practices and therefore have more 
opportunities to avoid the tax or compensate in other areas, for instance by transfer pricing 
etc. This would give an implicit advantage to these operators over the smaller vessels which 
according to the governments’ goals are singled out for "extra protection" as they are an 
integral part of maintaining settlements and employment in rural areas. This goes against the 
governments goals, but as stated before a discussion of the economic merits of efficiency in 
fisheries vs. settlements in rural areas is beyond the scope of this thesis. 
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In sum some goals may be achieved in the case of fisheries with regards to profitability, 
reduced overcapacity/redundancy and investment in new technology. This may reduce 
emissions in the long run, but in the short run emission levels are likely to be the same.  
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6. Alternatives 
In light of the discussion in the theory section of quotas vs. fees and taxes it is worth 
mentioning that a "cap and trade system" may be more efficient than the current scheme. In 
practice a simple system of tradable permits can be distributed among firms equal to the 
maximum amount of emissions that can be generated. This efficiently creates a market for 
externalities (Pindyck & Rubinfeld, 2005). This approach combines the simplicity of a quota 
system with the cost advantages of a fee system. This works by the cap serving as an 
effective "quota" and the trading mechanism allows abatement to be done at the lowest cost 
as in the case of an optimal fee system.  
As mentioned cap and trade systems mimics these features and work in practice by 
authorities auctioning off a fixed number of emissions permits to firms and other actors that 
are willing to bid. The firms also have the opportunity to trade between themselves. One 
permit could for instance be equal to one metric ton of CO2, as is the case in the EU ETS. A 
company that manages to reduce its emissions can either sell the spare permits to other 
companies thus offsetting the costs of the reduction or "store" the permits for use at a later 
date. This flexibility, in line with the basic theory outlined in the theory section, will lead to 
cost-efficient emissions cuts, with abatements taking place where it is cheapest/most 
effective, and those who cannot reduce at a reasonable cost still have to pay for the 
externalities they cause as they have to buy permits for the emissions in excess of their initial 
"allowance".  
This may also alleviate the burden of scrapping vessels or ships as the companies in question 
at least will be able to sell these permits or transfer them to other parts of their operation. 
While on the subject of cap and trade; an introduction of tradable quotas in fisheries may 
also lead to more efficient use of the most economically efficient vessels. Being able to sell 
quotas may also help ease the burden of scrapping vessels.   
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7. Recommendations 
A potential Prisoners dilemma was alluded to earlier as the reason behind the government 
not making the sectors face the full social cost of carbon. A "Prisoners Dilemma" where the 
individual nations actions are relative to the actions of the competitors. If a one nation 
implements enhanced regulations in the current economic climate its companies are likely to 
have to raise their prices and would therefore loose to its competitors resulting in lost jobs 
etc. for the nation that regulates. Its dominant strategy is therefore not to regulate, as it is the 
best course of action for the individual nation given what the competitors are doing under the 
current regulatory regime (or indeed: game setup).  
From this Prisoners Dilemma we may deduce that nations are neither oblivious to the 
potential benefits of emission reduction, nor to the projected damages from the current 
practice, but the game they are a part of is "rigged" so that they cannot make a difference 
individually without sustaining huge losses. Also, if one nation takes these losses other 
nations are likely to capture their market share and emissions will be the same i.e. it will 
only lead to carbon leakage. This calls for collaboration with other entities to step in and 
change the rules of the game. These entities may be the unilateral deal with other nations or 
unions such as the EU or the US or international bodies such as the IMO. Where the EU 
seems the most determined to make this happen. Norway should work together with the EU 
in this effort, as we currently indeed are. This effort should be intensified. 
I also believe that the actors in both the shipping and fisheries industry have an untapped 
potential to influence the Norwegian government, the EU and later other large entities by 
working with them rather than against them which seems to have been the "modus operandi" 
so far. Shipping has a number of bargaining chips up its sleeve: it already is less polluting 
than other transport methods on a ton/mileage basis, it is vital to global trade and it is the key 
for developing countries to access global markets. But its high dependence on oil, the flavor 
of public opinion and technological advances in other sectors poses that shipping is lagging 
behind.  
A strategy emphasizing the benefits of shipping to markets everywhere, which at the same 
time focuses on the constrained economic situation faced by the companies in the sectors, 
could be a potent argument. An effort to sway public opinion should also be made by asking 
the EU and the Norwegian government to "put their money where their mouth is". The 
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public is likely to understand that the sector needs clear guidelines and schemes to make the 
transition; it is easy for politicians to demand action as long as they are not accountable for 
the costs. The cost of not acting far exceed the costs of facilitation for the industry, with this 
comes bargaining power; if the public can be convinced. 
This could be a potential win-win. By supporting increased further efficiency and 
sustainability in the shipping and fisheries sectors and better serving of customers' (or 
inhabitants) expectations, the sectors can maintain a reasonable rate of return while 
implementing the changes. At the same time, at global level, the EU and Norway could be 
seen as a leading entities ensuring the functioning of trade links, PR it desperately wants 
(and needs) both internally and externally. Mandating Ships/vessels that enter or operate in 
EU' and Norwegian waters to comply with EU regulations has the potential to shift global 
standards in shipping and thus also raise demand for schemes to facilitate a financially viable 
transition in other economic areas as well.  
Turning to the climate and sector specific goals I hold the view that there are some conflicts 
between the climate goals and the sector specific goals in terms of the scheduling of the 
implementation of the reduction of the reimbursement scheme when it comes to short-sea 
shipping. I believe that the sector specific goals should be fulfilled before the reduction was 
implemented. Based on the discussion in section on the goals for the short-sea sector and 
potential double dividends above, the reduction as it has been implemented now has failed 
on reducing emissions and transitioning goods from road to sea. On the contrary the 
reduction seems to have increased the current negative trend of goods shifting from sea to 
road as largely confirmed by the very recent report from Riksrevisjonen (Riksrevisjonen, 
2014). 
The government has stated that the reduction of reimbursement scheme is to continue. 
Contrary to this I would recommend that the reimbursement is held at its current level until 
of the other goals for the sector is fulfilled.  
In the case of the fisheries sector the government should make clear its priorities when it 
comes to efficiency, reduced emissions, profitability and reduction of overcapacity on the 
one hand and maintaining settlements on the other. Based on the findings in this thesis these 
goals seem somewhat mutually exclusive. If it is determined that efficiency, reduced 
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emissions, profitability and reduction of overcapacity is valued over settlements; the 
reimbursement scheme may be further reduced for the fisheries sector. 
In both sectors the government should "earmark" the revenue from these taxes to work on 
abating the negative externalities these sectors generate. This could be done by research, 
investing in infrastructure etc. I believe that if this was the case the tax increase would be 
met with more understanding from the industries. 
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8. Summary and conclusion 
The purpose of this thesis was to conduct an analysis of the effects of reducing the mineral 
oil tax reimbursement scheme for the Norwegian short-sea shipping and fisheries sectors. An 
important contribution of this study has been to review this measure in a wide context based 
on the Norwegian governments own principles and goals relating to climate, environment 
and its goals for the short-sea shipping and fisheries sectors. Based on the dynamics of 
supply- and demand elasticities for the sectors the likely tax-incidence of this measure is 
shown. The tax incidence is in turn used to discuss and contrast the different outcomes for 
the sectors. The overall discussion answers the following questions:  
1. How will the reduction of the mineral oil tax reimbursement scheme affect the 
Norwegian short-sea shipping and fisheries sectors? 
2. Will the reduction help the government in reaching its "climate goals" and sector 
specific goals?  
3. Are there potentials for "double dividends" in terms of tax revenue, goal 
achievement and reduced emissions? 
4. Could anything be done differently? 
5. Based on the findings; what are the recommended course of action/polices going 
forward? 
Answering these questions the study has shown that the effects of the increased tax on 
mineral oil through reducing the tax refund are likely to affect the industries substantially. 
Costs are expected to rise by at least 2.2 percent for the short-sea shipping sector and at least 
1 percent for the fisheries sector. This increase is further expected to be shouldered almost 
entirely by the operators based on the tax incidence determined by the elasticities of supply 
and demand. The tax increase is expected to affect smaller actors more severely than larger 
ones due to the latters’ opportunities to avoid paying the tax by for instance refueling in 
other jurisdictions. 
The measure has also been evaluated in light of the governments own principles and goals 
for an environmental tax, and its goals for the individual sectors.  
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In terms of the principles and goals for environmental taxes the effort is found to be a step in 
the right direction, but still somewhat lacking as it falls short of estimates of the social cost 
of carbon.  
The tax is believed to be a better fit for the fishing industry and its situation, than it is for the 
short-sea sector. The short-sea sector has environmental benefits over its closest competitors, 
such as road transport and the tax increase may shift competition in favor of road transport. 
In fact the measure may even result in an increase of emissions in transport. This thesis also 
sees a conflict between the measure and the goals stated for the short-sea sector. Here the 
government needs to prioritize.  
When it comes to the fisheries sector some sector goals may be achieved with regards to 
profitability, reduced overcapacity/redundancy and investment in new technology. This may 
in turn reduce emissions in the long run, but in the short run emission levels are likely to be 
the same due to the elasticity of supply being perfectly inelastic.  
The sources of the shortcomings of the measure are discussed in terms of a prisoner’s 
dilemma situation. Drawing on the result of this "game", this thesis holds the view that 
Norway should work with the EU to implement the same regulations in all European waters. 
The sectors may also have the ability to influence policymakers to achieve more favorable 
terms if they work with the regulators rather than against them. 
I recommend that going forward the reimbursement scheme should be held constant for the 
short-sea shipping sector at least until other sector goals are achieved. For the fisheries sector 
however, the reduction of the reimbursement should continue.  
Truly, a summary of this evaluation of the total evaluation of the effects of reducing the 
mineral oil tax reimbursement scheme for the Norwegian short-sea shipping and fisheries 
sectors shows a story of conflicting goals leading to dubious results. 
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